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STABILISATION AND ADJUSTMENT : lJHAT HAVE WE LEARNED?
R.L. Kerr, Executive Director, NZ Business Roundtable
Introduction
For the past three years, an economic strategy has been
implemented in New Zealand which may be broadly characterised as
a stabilisation and adjustment programme (in IMF and World Bank
parlance) or as a programme for macroeconomic stability and
microeconomic flexibility, to use the language of the DECO. This
is an appropriate point to review experience to date, consider
some criticisms of the policy framework and discuss some
outstanding weaknesses. The treatment is necessarily selective.
Economic Performance
For a generation or more folloWing the 1930s' depression - the
decades of the New Zealand economic experiment - New Zealand
adopted an economic policy framework which was significantly at
variance with internationally recommended practice. As the
relatively poor growth performance of the economy became apparent
in the 1960s and serious imbalances developed in the 1970s,
sporadic attempts were made to address the problem by more
orthodox means. For example, in 1976/77 the fiscal deficit was
reduced substantially, some interest rate controls were removed
and a firmer monetary policy was adopted. From late 1978 to
mid-1980 there was a period of fiscal and monetary tightening and
a start to trade liberalisation. Each of these episodes,
however, was followed by a reversal of major elements of policy
1
and an erosion of the gains made. More lasting progress was made
in a few' areas such as the deregulation of the transport sector
and the establishment of a free trade area with Australia. The
reform programme initiated in 1984 has, to date, proceeded on a
more comprehensive scale and a more sustained basis.
By 1984 there was widespread community dissatisfaction with New
Zealand's economic performance as indicated, for example, in the
discussions of the Economic Summit of that year. Inevitably this
assessment was not shared by all economists. Gould [1985] was
sceptical of the view that New Zealand's performance was
unimpressive and that previous policies had been inappropriate.
There are acknowledged data problems in assessing long run growth
performance, especially in respect of the real GDP statistics for
the financial, insurance and real estate sectors, and other
services. A study by Bascand [1983], however, cast doubt on
whether the deterioration in New Zealand's growth rate and other
economic indicators relative to those of other countries since
the first oil shock could be attributed to terms of trade losses.
The OECD [1987] stated that:
"New Zealand's relative economic performance over the past
15 years has been poor, both relative to the OECD average as well
as compared with Australia which has an economic structure not
too dissimilar from that of New Zealand".
This is illustrated in the following diagram:
2
Diagram 1. R~'.I"~ ~ronomk ~rfonn.nre
1970-85 averages
Output (GOP) .roWlh
(pcr a:nt)
Current account hal.nee
(on pc"enl of GNP)
••
.-i ••
... -..
•• •• •. .
•••
".. "' ......2. ....
. "'"......
•
-OEeD
- - - - - Ne... Ze.I.nd
•••••••• A.ustralia
~~~:mployment -<C~--+~+--------t-------;lf--~-~lI-----+-
(per tenl)
Innalion
(pe, a:nl)
No,,: Th_ dia.,am plols major macrlHconomic perfo,mance indicalors .Ionl .he four rays from .he o,ilin.
Mca,unnj: KalC', arC' thosen such fhal pc-rlormancc 1mrra--el wuh dillan"r from the- oriBin. Tht dlaBfam
.ho.. , Ihat Ne.. Zealand had le",ro"lh. hllher innallon and ala,.e, cun<nll>alance drfitil.han Au"'ali.
and ,h_ DECO on avera,e. but Iha••he toun,,)', un_mplo,'ment ,aI_ ha, toeen lo"'e'.
Soura: OECO. E,onomi, Ou,/oo!. ~. Oecemtoer 19t1t> and (jECO. Eron"m" Ow,/oo!: Hino",,,1 S,alls,;es
JWJI)·/WU.
Source DECD Economic Surveys 1986/87 New Zealand, p9.
The relatively better average unemployment outcome must be
qualified by the observation that increases in employment have
been modest during this period, productivity growth has been the
lowest in the DECD region. and unemployment has been on a rising
Moreover, such a snapshot does nottrend in the past decad~~
fully capture the influence of such developments as increases in
the tax burden or the stock of public debt which may impair
economic performance over time.
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It might also be noted that the cOmparison with Australia is not
a flattering one, as Australia's performance has been at bEist
mediocre. Also New Zealand's performance has been W'eak in areas
where Australia's has been weak, but more $0. This may suggest
that common factors have been at work. One explanation,
suggested by the work of Olsen, might be the effects of interest
group coalitions, manifesting themselves in areas like trade
protection and the labour market, over a long period of political
stability and isolation from disturbances in the outside world.
Much more important than measures of comparative economic
performance is a consideration of whether economic management in
New Zealand realised the full potential of the economy. Many of
the recent initiatives have been based on an extensive body of
analysis which suggested that a number of interventions reduced
the efficiency of the economy and, in addition, made a poor
contribution to objectives of social equity.
Chronologies of the measures adopted since July 1984 are set out
in recent Budgets and OECD reviews of New Zealand, and the
principles underlying them are well known. In many ways the
problems addressed correspond closely to those of other countries
for which stabilisation and adjustment programmes have been
recommended, including the development of unsus~ainable internal
and external disequilibria. In evaluating the decisions made,
account needs to be taken of the financial crisis of 1984 and the
constraints it imposed on policy choices. Regard also needs to
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be had to the political economy factors faced by policy-makers as
well as technical aspects of policy design.
Review of Economic Debate
It is instructive to review some of the main criticisms of
official policy advice and decisions in the light of experience
to date. In doing so, it needs to be remembered that the stated
policy framework is a medium term one, normally thought of as
around 3-5 years, and that the effects of many of the decisions
made have not yet worked through. The Minister of Finance has
also recently stated (correctly) that the Government is only
50 percent of the way through what might be regarded as an
orthodox programme of economic reform.
(i) Fiscal policy
One theme of criticism concerned the speed of attempts to reduce
the fiscal deficit. Philpott and Easton, for example, argued
that too much emphasis was placed on this objective (Philpott
[1985], Easton [1985]). The concern that fiscal contraction
would produce a 'hard landing' in the economy was essentially
based on a Keynesian analysis. The Treasury in its Economic
Management [1984] briefing expressed doubts about the weight to
be placed on such an analysis. While speed was seen as a
legitimate concern and a deficit reduction target of 2 percentage
points per annum was suggested, it pointed out that policies to
reduce the deficit were not necessarily more contractionary than
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the consequences for interest rates and expectations of ongoing
large sc?le borrowing and an increase in public debt. Moreover,
effic iency- enhanc ing initiatives affecting public sector
performance and supply conditions in the private sector were seen
as offsetting such effects to .some extent.
In a medium term context, it can be more strongly argued that
growth will be greater the lower the accumulated tax burden from
debt overhangs associated with previous borrowing to support
consumption and/or low return investment programmes. In addition
to the adaptive and rational expectations critiques, the
Keynesian focus on flow issues (income generation) and neglect of
stock issues (debt) seems a major deficiency in the economic
framework many economists brought to fiscal policy discussions in
the last 30 years. Where debt was included it was typically in
terms of debt instability, which merely cpntained the idea that
an explosive state could occur if interest rates exceeded growth
rates. Even now, it is difficult to find material in the
economic literature which offers policy-makers many insights into
the question of optimal medium term deficit targets or objectives
for public sector net worth.
Even though the deficit has been brought down from a measured 6.9
percent of GDP (GFS basis) in 1983/84 to an estimated 2.2 percent
in 1987/88, from a technical point of view it seems clear with
the benefit of hindsight that progress has been too slow rather
than too rapid. At no stage has a sharp recession appeared
likely, and economic forecasters have consistently underestimated
6
real GDP growth. Investor confidence was sustained when clear
evidence'was available of progress in achieving fiscal control,
and faltered at times of uncertainty. However, this judgement on
speed needs to be balanced by an appreciation of the time
required to develop sound medium term initiatives, and the need
to maintain a constituency for the overall programme.
It is likely that further fiscal consolidation may now, on
balance, still be contractionary in the short term (although the
possibility of dollar-for-dollar crowding-in cannot be ruled
out). However, there now appears to be a broad consensus that
high priority should be attached to maintaining the progress made
on deficit reductions and reviewing government outlays which are
not cost-effective or well-targeted. From a macro perspective,
greater emphasis on fiscal action is likely to put more of the
burden of adjustment on the non-tradeables sector and less on
tradeables. To reduce the massive overhang of public and
external debt, a series of fiscal surpluses in the medium term
would appear to be a desirable policy goal, as has been
recognised in recent Government statements.
Experience appears to have confirmed the shift in economic
thinking away from Keynesian approaches to deficit spending.
Buchanan [1987] has called attention to the intergenerational
inequity involved in forcing our children to pay for current
spending policies, and has argued that 'the basic moral
dimension of fiscal policy must be elevated to centre stage'.
Attention is now being focused more directly on government
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spending, and hence on efforts to improve the extent to which
efficiency and equity objectives are achieved through the
government's fiscal interventions.
(ii) Exchange rate management
A second criticism of official policy concerned the exchange rate
regime. Indeed, despite sweeping criticisms of the economic
framework adopted by the Treasury and the Reserve Bank in their
post-election briefing, this was the only area in which Zanetti
and others [1985] committed themselves to an alternative policy
prescription. They incorrectly suggested that arguments for a
floating regime were derived from a simplistic monetary approach
to the balance of payments. Instead the case relied much more
heavily on a comparative institutions framework : did bureaucrats
and politicians possess better information and have superior
incentives to make sound decisions about the price of foreign
exchange than market participants? Furthermore, were there sound
reasons for suppressing, via controls. the role of the nominal
exchange rate in facilitating the external and domestic
adjustment task? These questions were particularly important in
a period of major changes to commodity exchange rates (effective
rates of assistance) in the traded goods sector. and in the
labour market with the removal of wage controls.
From a similar perspective ('that there is no reason to suppose
that central banks have any special gift for outguessing or even
correctly guessing where the market is or should be going'),
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Clower [1984] commented at the time that 'the efficiency-
creating' potential of a move by New Zealand from fixed to freely
floating exchange rates is too obvious to require argument".
While few would go so far as to advocate a floating regime for
all countries in all periods, experience since the float in March
1985 appears to support this conclusion in current New Zealand
circumstances. It is difficult to believe that an alternative
regime would have coped nearly as well with the domestic
financial sector adjustments, the swings in international
currencies and the large changes in effective rates of assistance
in the goods market that have characterised this period. In the
circumstances, the relative stability of the New Zealand dollar
(on a monthly basis) has been a surprising feature. Moreover,
although this was not a primary motivation, floating has helped
reduce monetary policy uncertainty and contrasts with the
difficulties Australia seems to have experienced since it
commenced interventions to prop up the Australian dollar.
There now seems to be a broad political consensus in New Zealand
in favour of a free float, although some special interest groups
may continue to put forward arguments for 'managing' the
exchange rate towards a more 'appropriate' level (and, as always,
an economist may be found who will support their case). There
have also been some interesting recent insights offered in the
economic literature on floating. In an article in which he
concluded that alternative regimes, including taxes on capital
flows, are not clearly preferable to freely floating exchange
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rates, Dornbusch draws an interesting comparison with bond and
stock markets:
"Many economists would be coy in responding to proposals to
set target zones for interest rates or for the stock market.
They would ask immediately how these target zones are to be made
to 'stick', and would certainly be concerned if the answer was
monetary policy... But what is different about target zones for
exchange rates? The only difference I can see is that target
zones for interest rates or the stock market are discredited
(perhaps excessively), while exchange rate fixing is a fad that
has a way of coming back" (Dornbusch [1987], P 49).
Although floating has produced few surprises, there are some
features which have emerged more clearly with experience. One is
the ability of financial institutions and firms to climb the
learning curve associated with foreign exchange management. This
contradicts some fears held at the time and tends to confirm
other evidence (e.g. Black [1976] and Lal [1980]) that the
institutional requirements of a floating exchange rate system are
possibly exaggerated. It has also become clearer that the
foreign exchange market performs an additional extremely
important role, especially in a political system with as few
checks and balances as New Zealand's, in monitoring the quality
of economic management. The slide in the Australian exchange
rate since February 1985 highlighted the weaknesses in that
country in budgetary and labour market policies, in particular,
in a dramatic way. While there are separate and compelling
arguments for electoral reform in New Zealand to lock in the
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incentives for maintaining sound economic policies, open foreign
exchange' and financial markets will continue to signal
shortcomings in a speedy and unremitting manner.
More speculatively, the floating rate system has perhaps helped
to demonstrate the consensus-building properties of the price
mechanism. Politically it would have been very difficult for a
government to find any analytical basis for deciding how to
'manage' the exchange rate - whether upwards to reduce inflation
or downwards to help exporters - over the last three years. A
major problem is that economists have a poor grasp of the
question of optimal capital flows through the balance of payments
on which to base a view about an appropriate short term profile
for the exchange rate. Nor, for that matter, do governments
really have the resources to control it.
(iii) Sequencing
Associated with the debate on exchange rate management have been
critic~sms of the order and timing of policy changes. Zanetti
and others claimed this issue had been completely overlooked by
the Government's advisers and Federated Farmers [1987] have
recently referred to an 'incorrect sequencing of economic
reform' .
Contrary to the Zanetti claims, New Zealand policy advisers made
the relationship between macroeconomic policy and economic
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liberalisation a maj or topic of research and inquiry amongst
internattonal specialists during 1983 and 1984. This work
motivated the suggestion in the exchange rate chapter in Economic
Management that the 'essential agenda for discussion' was:
..... the sequence of macropolicy and market liberalisation
moves, and the communication of their implications to the public
and to labour market participants in particular, which would
facilitate the smooth introduction of a floating regime" (p 169).
The order adopted by the Government was essentially the removal
of capital market controls (in conjunction with the 1984
devaluation), a programme to reduce the fiscal deficit initiated
in the 1984 Budget, the removal of exchange controls followed by
the float, an acceleration of trade liberalisation, and the
removal of wage controls followed by limited steps to free up the
labour market. This sequencing was driven by the harsh realities
of events, the differing times required to implement various
policy measures and the need to promote confidence in the entire
strategy, as well as theoretical considerations.
Based on the experience of the Southern Cone countries, some
writers (e.g. Krueger [1984]) have put forward the view that in
liberalising the foreign exchange, domestic credit and labour
markets, the capital account of the foreign exchange market
should be liberalised last. Exactly how the exchange rate might
be defended during this period is somewhat unclear. This
'technocratic' view has been disputed in a recent article by Lal
[1986] based on a political economy analysis of economic
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liberalisation. He argues instead that a package which will most
effectively reduce the costs of adjustment is initial
liberalisation of domestic capital markets simultaneous with cuts
in the fiscal deficit, followed by floating the exchange rate and
then commodity market liberalisation.
Lal ' 5 analys is
remarks on the
is too lengthy to
liberalisation of
summarise in full, but the
the capital account are of
special interest in the New Zealand context. He notes that the
real worry of the opponents of liberalisation of the capital
account is that it could lead to an overshooting of capital
inflows with an accompanying overshooting in the real exchange
rate. But he points out that if there is a sustainable level of
foreign capital inflows following liberalisation, then the
resulting exchange rate appreciation cannot be regarded as a
problem for the country. Even if the real exchange rate were to
first appreciate and then depreciate over time, involving an
initial expansion and then contraction of the non-traded goods
sector, this cannot be said to constitute an inefficient
adjustment process unless one assumes that the government knows
the correct time path of the real exchange rate while myopic
and/or ignorant private agents do not. Moreover, if the
overshooting argument against the removal of capital controls is
correct, it should apply at any time, irrespective of whether or
not trade liberalisation has taken place.
In its application to the New Zealand setting, this analysis
complements the findings of studies that cast doubt on simplistic
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linkages between high fiscal deficits and high interest rates
(e.g. Evans [1985]) and on the further linkage between interest
rates and the exchange rate (e.g. Wilkinson and Keenan [1986]).
The latter pOlnt out that from an international bond market
perspective, causation does not run from interest rates to the
exchange rate. Rather, both are endogenous, and a drop or rise
in interest rates may be associated with a rise or fall in the
spot exchange rate depending on what is causing world perceptions
of New Zealand to change. Wilkinson and Keenan argue that it is
New Zealand's past economic performance, in terms of inflation
and a soft currency, which is likely to explain recent domestic
interest rate levels and that a lower risk premium can only be
achieved by consistent pursuit of sensible monetary and fiscal
policies. The particular exchange rate and interest rate
configuration we observe therefore reflects, amongst other
things. a combination of confidence in the future of the New
Zealand economy (affecting desired capital flows) and the legacy
of the past built into interest rates.
Lal's conclusion is that most of the 'crises' that require the
stabilisation cum adjustment medicine are primarily crises of
the public sector and other interventions motivated by special
interest groups. At the heart of the remedial programme of
gaining fiscal control by reducing public expenditure and
removing inefficient economic regulations is the need to confront
or buyout vested interests. Seen from this perspective. he
argues that the order of liberalisation which minimises the
adjustment costs is less important
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than its political
sustainability, and that "for the credibility of the process,
speed in implementing the liberalisation of the various repressed
markets may be of the essence". At the technical level, he
recommends a floating exchange rate system, the absence of which
largely explains, in his view, the Southern Cone debacles.
On these criteria, the policy choices of the New Zealand
authorities would appear to score relatively highly. It would
have been naive to expect faster initial action on labour market
reform given the political interests involved, the inertia
involved in that market and the need to develop community
understanding of the need for change, although the slowness of
subsequent progress has been disappointing. By contrast, the
early removal of capital market distortions has facilitated a
more efficient allocation of capital to new investment
opportunities. However, Lal' s argument draws attention to the
need to maintain evenhandedness and a rapid momentum of reform,
and to concentrate on outstanding policy weaknesses in the public
sector, the labour market and trade liberalisation. l
(iv) Hlcroeconomlc polley
The thrust of New Zealand's microeconomic policy reforms has
lA comment by an overseas visitor on a draft version of this
paper seems an appropriate summary on sequencing :
"What a strange (and very academic) issue for the debate to
get hung up onl So long as changes are made quickly enough and
future directions are clearly foreshadowed, any adjustment costs
from less than ideal sequencing will hardly be large."
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found more favour among academic economists, although exceptions
can be noted (e.g. Sheppard (1987)). Thus Philpott (1987) has
awarded 'high marks' to initiatives such as the SOE programme,
the dismantling of import control and subsidies, tariff
reductions, the tax switch to CST and the introduction of
competition. Philpott's current position is remarkable in view
of his longstanding advocacy of planning and control approaches
to economic management. For example, he has previously argued
that import controls 'can be a most powerful and useful method of
encouraging local import substitution industries and of saving
foreign exchange', and indeed if industries were policed by price
control 'total prohibition of imports would be justified'
(Philpott [1972], p 273). His support for current microeconomic
policy does not extend, however, to the key markets for labour
amd foreign exchange. Although there is now tripartite agreement
in favour of free wage bargaining, Philpott has continued to
support wages and incom~s policies, as well as an administered
exchange rate. This distinction between microeconomic
flexibility and macroeconomic controls lacks analytical
coherence, as the comment by Dornbusch quoted earlier implicitly
indicates.
In the area of market liberalisation, experience since 1984
confirms earlier indications that the economy can absorb a
relatively rapid rate of reduction in protection and subsidies
without incurring a significant under-utilisation of resources.
Hopefully we have heard the last of predictions that protection
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reductions would throw 400, 000 people out of work. A maj or
international study of trade liberalisation in 19 countries
recently conducted under World Bank auspices concludes that "the
costs of adjustment as reflected by unemployment do not seem to
be significant in most cases" (Papageorgiou, Michaely and Choksi
[1986]p 14). It seems clear that employment trends are much more
strongly determined by the development of unit labour costs and
labour market flexibility, and that the way to reduce the
adjustment costs of trade liberalisation is to reduce barriers to
labour market adjustment. On the other hand, the income
distribution consequences of liberalisation can be significant,
as experience in the farming sector has shown. Many writers have
observed that this factor explains the frequent opposition to
change among management level employees in protected industries.
It is perhaps regrettable that outside the government agencies
there has been little research and debate in New Zealand on such
microeconomic topics as public enterprise policy, producer
boards, competition policy and the labour market. This may be
impeding advances in these areas of the type that have been seen
in recent years in many overseas jurisdictions.
Conclusions
This brief survey of recent experience with stabilisation and
adjustment policies is far from comprehensive, excluding, for
example, any treatment of monetary and liquidity management. But
it may point to the emergence of a more settled professional
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consensus on some issues, which mirrors the convergence of
approach which we appear to be witnessing in the broader
political debate on economic management. One of the most
important lessons of the past three years is without doubt the
overiding importance of consistency and credibility about future
directions. If this is established, rapid and efficient
adjustment can occur with much lower short-run costs.
These developments may be a source of some satisfaction and of
hope for the maintenance of sounder economic policies, but there
is also a risk of a loss of perspective. New Zealand's economic
problems, in forms such as the burden of public and overseas
debt, the level and distribution of structural unemployment and
the lack of productivity growth, remain massive. While the
maintenance of present policies could see inflation under control
within a couple of years, major ongoing initiatives are required
to overcome other key problems.
Recent policy changes may have gone some distance towards
stopping the rot but, by comparison with the stance of the most
successful OECD economies, the present configuration of policy in
New Zealand seems unlikely to lift its economic performance to
anywhere near its full potential. No dynamic economy operates
with tariffs at levels remotely approaching those of New Zealand
and it is possible that with the slowness of reforms in
industries like motor vehicles and apparel, and moves to
eliminate assistance to many export and primary sector activities
and goods not made in New Zealand, disparities in assistance are
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currently worsening. New Zealand is almost unique in maintaining
extensive state involvement in industries such as finance and
forestry, and has been slow to reap the benefits of privatisation
programmes of the type widely adopted in the DEeD area.
Furthermore, it risks committing errors made elsewhere of
following commercialisation or privatisation policies for
industries which continue to operate in highly regulated
environments; the deregulation of markets such as
telecommunications, broadcasting and petroleum products should
occur at an early stage.
New Zealand's labour market institutions remain far removed from
those of high employment, high productivity economies and are
impeding the attainment of social goals. A great deal of
evidence points to the crucial role of work and work experience -
ranking well ahead of variables such as ethnic background, sex,
class and education - in determining low income status. There
has been little consideration to date of the performance of the
health and education sectors which use resources equivalent to
over 10 percent of GDP, nor to the effectiveness and cost of many
aspects of the social security system. Spending in these areas
accounts for a substantial proportion of the overall tax burden
and high marginal tax rates negatively influence the supply of
output by the economy. It is important that these social policy
interventions are reviewed with the aim of ensuring that they
represent the most cost-effective method of meeting the
Government's social objectives, and that the least cost methods
of financing social programmes are adopted.
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It is possible, however, that the technical solutions to many of
these' problems will not be difficult to discover. Richard
Prebble has recently made the interesting observation that New
Zealand politicians from both sides of the House have known for
years what was wrong with the economy and what needed to be done
but considered it would be politically fatal to implement the
appropriate policies (Douglas and Callan [1987] p 7). This may
suggest that economic inquiry in New Zealand has concentrated too
much on matters of economic allocation and stability and not
enough on the lessons from the development of public choice
theory over the past 25 years. There is little doubt that it
should occupy a larger place in undergraduate programmes
alongside the traditional preoccupations of welfare economics.
Obvious and direct applications of the theory's insights apply to
policy issues as varied and important as the autonomy of the
Reserve Bank, the machinery of government, electoral reform and
the scope for constitutional limitations on fiscal operations and
regulatory interventions. The public choice literature also
reminds us of the importance of the incentives facing politicians
and the pervasive scope for government failure. A critical
foundation for policies that promote the interests of the whole
community is greater efforts at public education on economic
affairs.
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The theme of my address today can be expressed quite simply - although I
hope it is not simplistic. It is that another round of international
trade negotiations cannot restore order in international trade as long
as it deals only with the international symptoms of the crisis, and not
its national causes. Without some bas ic changes in national pol icy-
making environments in the major GATT countries, there is a very real
danger that the Uruguay Round will founder. My object is to identify
the sort of changes that are needed and to outline a recent proposal for
achieving them.
That the Uruguay Round is happening at all, given the negative attitudes
of some of the key players, is quite remarkable. What it shows is that
most governments are genuinely alarmed at the protectionist trends, both
in their external markets and at home. It also suggests that
governments believe that, on their own, they are impotent to deal with
them.
It is conventional ,wisdom among commercial diplomats that a multilateral
negotiation in process deters protectionism. This has come to be known
as the 'bicycle theory of trade negotiations', meaning that if we don't
keep peddling we'll fall off. But the exper ience of the Tokyo Round
belies that assumption. It was at that time, when concessions were
being swapped in Geneva and new codes of conduct formulated, that some
of the most protectionist actions of recent times were taking place: the
global protection regime for textiles and clothing was greatly
strengthened, the steel tr igger pr ice mechanism was introduced in the
US, and the protected cartels for steel and synthetic fibres were being
perfected in the European Community.
To now conduct a new round of trade negotiations on the same old premise
- that protectionism can be stopped just through negotiations in Geneva
- puts me in mind of one of Dr Johnson's famous quips. (I refer to
Samuel not Harry). As I recall it, when told of the decision of a
recently divorced acquaintance to remarry, he remarked: 'That sir,
represents the triumph of hope over experience' .
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In the case of Dr Johnson's friend, his hopes may well have been
justified. But the outlook for the Uruguay Round, despite its bulging
agenda, is less than promising. In the short time since negotiations
were launched in Punta del Este, we have witnessed the escalation of the
subsidy war in agr icul tural trade, widespread support for new
protectionist bills in the US Congress, and discriminatory actions
against Japanese trade which are unprecedented in GATT's history - and
that is saying something.
These actions certainly seem to deflate the bicycle theory. Not only do
GATT negotiations appear to have little effect on day-to-day protection
decisions, the GATT rules themselves appear to have become largely
irrelevant to actual policy conduct.
It is not that governments openly repudiate those rules. On the
contrary, they can be found reaffirming the fundamental norms of GATT at
international meetings allover the world.
Indeed it would be difficult for them to do otherwise, for the basic
rules of GATT - non-discrimination and tariff-only protection - are
unexceptionable enough. Their value was demonstrated to all by the
economic and political consequences of their absence in the 1930s and
40s. The unhappy trade policy experience of that time also convinced
governments that international commitments which constrained each
country's freedom to 'beggar its neighbours', could also prevent
governments from beggaring their own populations. They also believed
that an explicit international-legal agreement would strengthen them In
their dealings with domestic pressure groups, disciplining their trade
policy in the national interest.
If the principle was sound, its execution was not. The General
Agreement, in its final form, contained exceptions to almost every
rule. It is a compromise document, in which the influence of the
producer interests - which it was designed to constrain - is apparent on
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almost every page. Moreover, though in principle having the role of a
treaty, its status in the domestic law of most countries is in practice
very weak and the interpretation of its provisions has been largely a
matter for the governmental descendants of those diplomats who drafted
it.
Even casual observation reveals that the two cornerstones of that
agreement are these days honoured mainly in the breach. Non-
discriminatory tariffs have become largely irrelevant in todays I new I
protection systems, which depend on 'domestic' subsidies, I voluntary I
restraint agreements and the discretionary application of 'unfair' trade
rules. The contractual core of the GATT has become moribund.
But the malaise is equally apparent in the negotiating mode of the
insti tution. The traditional reciprocal trade bargaining process has
been aptly described as a world of 'requests'. Each country approaches
trade negotiations with a pretty clear idea of what it wants from other
countries, but very little idea about what liberalisat ion strategy it
should pursue domestically. In fact, most governments work out their
'concessions' only in response to the requests of their trading
partners. In this situation, trade diplomats are inevitably forced into
a defensive attitude - trying to 'give away' no more than the minimum
necessary to achieve foreign gains. They act as if they believe that
exports are the only gain, and imports the pain, from trade
negotiations.
From an economy-wide perspective, this attitude is nonsense and clearly
damaging to the interests of each nation. From the perspective of
particular uncompetitive industries, however, it makes a lot of sense.
The mercantilist approach to trade negotiations, and the rise of the new
protectionism, are proof that government policy has been shaped more by
sectional perspectives than a truly national one.
Governments, by their actions, appear to have lost the ability to abide
by international commitments which they acknowledge to be in their
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collective interests; in other words, they have lost control of their
policy agendas. Trade' policy' - and I use the word advisedly - seems
to have become the almost accidental by-product of a process of
accommodation of domestic pressure groups.
But this development has itself been no accident. It reflects a
systematic bias in the domestic policy-making environments of GATT
member countries. That bias occurs on both the 'demand' and the
'supply' sides of what has come to be called the political market for
protection.
First, on the demand side, there is the long-recognised imbalance in the
demands on government to redistribute income from large to small groups
within society. This phenomenon has been rigorously analysed in the
modern political economy literature, but it is really just a matter of
common sense. In each particular decision on protection, the potential
gainers individually have much at stake, while the potential losers
individually have little - even though the aggregate redistribution of
income and the cumulative cost to the economy, may be very large. As a
result, adjustment-averting producers are able to overcome free-rider
obstacles to effective collective action, but consumers and taxpayers
are not.
This inherent imbalance in the 'demand for protection' is compounded by
the fact that uninformed public opinion frequently supports vested
interests, either based on illusions of a 'free lunch', or because the
conflict is seen as being between the interests of a national group
(local enterprises and their labour forces) and 'foreigners'. Such
misconceptions are understandable, for the economic principles involved
are not intuitively obvious. What's more, the spokesmen for industry
have an incentive to foster misconceptions about protection and in this
they are aided by the human-interest perspective of the popular press.
Imminent job losses and factory closures make much better 'copy' than
complicated arguments about the damage to job opportunities in other
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occupations and industries which protectionism engenders.
So Government will normally be under pressure to grant protection to
producer groups. This is a fact of political life and always has
been. In itself it need not explain the loss of GATT's effectiveness.
But there is a second aspect to consider.
It is not generally appreciated that in most countries the imbalance in
the demand for protection is compounded by government administrative
arrangements which actually favour the claims of sectional interests: in
other words, that there is also a systematic bias on the supply side of
the protection 'market'.
In most countries, government administrations are divided into numerous
departments, many established primarily to provide a communication link
between government and various interest groups. In such departments, a
symbiotic relationship naturally develops with their 'cl ient' groups,
the existence and growth of each being to some extent interdependent.
In a sense, a part of the bureaucracy becomes an extension of the
private special-interest group. This doesn't mean that the pUblic
servants are behaving improperly; only that the 'public' whose interests
they are serving is a rather narrow segment of the whole. Where that
segment of the public is an industry seeking protection against imports,
the main source of advice available to government in evaluating its
claim is normally the very department with which it is associated. The
resul t is equivalent to a shopkeeper asking the Mafia's lawyer for
advice about whether to pay protection money!
To take an example of particular importance to Australia and New
Zealand, the EEC's Common Agricultural Policy has evolved into the
monster it is today for some very good bureaucratic reasons.
Agr icultural 'policy' in the EC - and again I use the term advisedly -
is essentially made by the representat i yes of national Departments of
Agriculture, meeting in splendid isolation in Brussels. This - together
with the need for consensus (ie. the triumph of the least-best)
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clearly biases the range of possible outcomes. It also provides a
convenient means by which each Minister can return to his domestic
colleagues blaming the cost of protectionist policies on the others.
In sum, administrative arrangements have a vitally important effect on
policy outcomes. They not only influence the government's response to
protectionist demands, but also the nature and extent of those
demands. If government creates an institutional environment which
raises the expected return to rent-seeking, it is only to be expected
that the demand for assistance will respond.
For reasons identified by Mancur Olson, there has been a steady growth
in pressure groups during the relatively stable period since GATT was
formed. This has been matched by rapid growth and increased
fragmentation of government bureaucracies - for reasons best described
by Northcote Parkinson. The result is that GATT's influence has been
continuously eroded. And as the power of precedent asserted itself,
this has turned into.a rout.
Instead of GATT rules influencing trade policy, the opposite situation
has now been reached, in which domestic policy outcomes determine how
governments interpret their GATT obligations. In some cases, they have
found suitable GATT 'cover'. (Anti-dumping is very much in vogue in my
country, I don't know about yours). In other cases, the GATT rules were
suspended - agriculture and textiles and clothing are good examples. In
yet others, governments simply summoned a hitherto unsuspected ingenuity
in devising trade restrictions that evade GATT disciplines altogether.
I am speaking here of so-called voluntary restraint arrangements.
It follows that Government policies will continue to diverge from GATT
principles, and trade negotiations will continue to achieve only the
illusion of progress, as long as the overwhelming bias in favour of
claimant industries remains.
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Governments can do little about the superior organisational ability of
industry lobbies. But they can ensure that administrative processes do
not load the dice in these groups I favour. And they can also ensure
that those groups in the community who bear the costs of protection are
better informed. Olson describes this information about industry
interventions as a collective good. If so, it is one of the few
collective goods that an expanding government bureaucracy has neglected
to supply.
It seems indisputable that a proper understanding of the economy-wide
effects of protection is a necessary precursor for durable reform. What
is obViously also desirable is that this understanding can be achieved
without the sort of economic experience of the 1930s. Subsequent
history has shown that even understanding borne of adversity can be
lost. People learn their lessons, but then they forget them again. The
problem is a continuing, systematic one, requiring an institutional
solution.
At this point, I am starting to feel that I am preaching to the
converted. The New Zealand gov.ernment was clearly conv inced of the need
for a more systematic, economy-wide scrutiny of industry interventions
when it established the Economic Development Commission last year. And,
in Australia, the Industries Assistance Commission has been generating
information on, and advising the Government about industry assistance
since 1974. I think that we have some progress to show for that -
although it has been painfully slow at times and not always in the most
desirable direction.
But consider the situation in those agricultural sUbsidising countries
that are causing efficient primary exporters so much difficulty.
Policy-making in the EC is character ised by an almost total absence of
pUblic scrutiny and debate. The first information on the economic
consequences of the CAP that most Europeans ever saw was produced in
1985 by the Bureau of Agricultural Economics in Australia! A similar
situation exists in Japan; while in the United States, much policy is
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shrouded in a legalistic haze that obfuscates the effects of, and lends
an unwarranted legitimacy to, policies that have nothing to do with the
interests of the American community as a whole.
It is difficult to believe that any multilateral progress can be made on
agricultural reform (or anything else for that matter) without general
acceptance in the countries concerned of the national benefits of that
reform.
It is true that the Uruguay Round has placed agriculture squarely on its
agenda. And I think that the Cairns Group helped achieve that. But
this will not be the first GATT negotiations to try to liberalise trade
in agriculture. Both the Kennedy and Tokyo Rounds tried and failed.
The Ministerial commitment in the Uruguay Declaration to negotiate on
agriculture, while not explicitly qualified (as in the Tokyo
Declaration), nevertheless contains sufficient ambiguity to permit quite
different interpretations of its objectives by the major countries
involved. Indeed, both Australia and the European Community found it
necessary to provide their own interpretations at the conclusion of the
Ministerial Session. It is not reassuring that M. De Clercq took this
opportunity to reaffirm that the Community's 'fundamental common
policies and mechanisms are not up for negotiation'.
Whether substantive liberalisation actually eventuates, will be
determined - as in the past - by the perceptions of national interest
that each country takes to the negotiating table.
The price-support policies that are behind our countries' export
problems are very costly to those countries that practise them. It is
from the widespread recognition of that fact within those countries,
rather than from diplomatic pressure, that genuine reform is most likely
to emerge. The recent attempts to modify the CAP and to reduce
agricultural production in the United States have stemmed from the
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domestic difficulties caused by these policies. While these moves have
been motivated more by budgetary than efficiency concerns and
therefore need not be significantly trade liberalising - they are a
beginning. What has been lacking from multilateral negotiations has
been a search for ways of facilitating such domestic recognition, within
the countries responsible for trade distorting policies, of the need for
reform in their own national interest.
The importance of this issue is beginning to be recognised
internationally. A promising initiative has been under discussion by a
study group organised by the Trade Policy Research Centre in London, and
chaired by Olivier Long, former Director-General of the GATT. In its
forthcoming report, that group proposes that GATT members use the
opportunity provided by the Uruguay Round to negotiate an agreement on
'domestic transparency'. Under the envisaged agreement, each government
would designate an independent body with a broad mandate to pUblicly
report on all forms of industry assistance from an economy-wide
perspective. It's activities would be purely advisory. It would not
have any executive 01' jUdicial power. Its role would be confined to
improving the quality and pUblic availability of policy-relevant
information.
In the GATT context, this constitutes quite a new approach to a long-
standing problem. It has been advanced in order to correct the
perceived weakness of the adversarial approach to multilateral trade
negotiations, in which each participant has sought to gain concessions
at the expense of others. The Study Group is basing its proposal on the
following propositions: that the important trade barriers are
increasingly in non-tariff forms, which have traditionally been viewed
as part of domestic policy; that because outsiders usually cannot see
them, those barriers cannot be brought into account in international
negotiations unless governments imposing them choose to place them 'on
the record'; and that their motivation for doing so must be to enhance
domestic welfare rather than to make concessions sought by foreigners.
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While it is to be expected that vested interests will oppose such an
initiative, most governments should not. To the extent that they have
had difficulty in resisting pressures for policies that they know to be
contrary to their long-term objectives, they should welcome the greater
opportunity that it would provide for broader political support.
The trade problems faced by both Australia and New Zealand have their
origin in the domestic policy environments of our trading partners. As
presently constituted, the multilateral trade negotiations do not
address this fundamental problem. The purpose of promoting a domestic
transparency initiative in GATT is to provide a constructive, domestic
underpinning to the negotiations. Without it, the Uruguay Round might
just sink into the swamp.
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STATE OWNED ENTERPRISES: CORPORATISATION fA MASSIVE HOAX'
Colin Hicks, President, Public Service Association
The Government has justified its drive to convert state
departments into corporations, to contract out state
services and to shift to a user-pays basis of provision of
service on the grounds that this will:
improve efficiency in the provision of services;
promote accountability for the delivery of service and
for managerial performance.
The superficial attraction of improved efficiency and
accountability has led to a number of organisations giving
this programme explicit support. The problem is that
corporatisation has in fact got virtually nothing to do with
either efficiency or accountability.
Accountability of either managers or Ministers, to
Parliament specifically and to the public generally, has
been obviously and substantially diluted. We have created a
commercial screen to shield state enterprises from public
scrutiny. Instead of making the secret world of private
commerce more accountable to the communities, consumers, and
workers from whom they profit, corporatisation has shifted
vast areas of resource use and pricing of services behind
the closed doors to corporate board rooms.
The pace and form of corporatisation has also dislocated the
management and personnel operational routines of the
previous departmental organisation and there is a growing
inefficiency now becoming apparent within most of the
corporations.
35
Instead of upgrading the management information and control
systems of the public sector and then looking at what
organisational changes were needed to improve efficiency,
the Government went about things completely the wrong way
around. It changed the organisational structure and
management systems and is now scrambling around trying to
find financial structures and monitoring systems to apply to
those new life forms.
Massive Hoax
The corporatisation exercise has been a massive hoax. It
has been a guise for three things:
converting service deliverers into subtle forms of tax
gatherers;
cutting back the range and depth of services;
ending cross-subsidisation of public sector pricing,
particularly of electricity, postal and
telecommunications services.
Corporatisation is about redistributing income, not about
improving efficiency. The losers will be:
public sector workers;
small scale, remote consumers;
consumers in areas that are high cost to service.
I have heard farmers say that they support corporatisation,
but oppose increasing rural delivery charges, and higher
electricity and phone charges for provincial or rural
consumers. They can't sustain that position.
corporatisation is precisely about increasing those charges
and allowing a redirection of resources towards high profit,
high growth areas of the economy.
There has not been enough recognition of the impact of a new
public sector price regime on agricultural costs and
incomes, and of the flow-on effects of this.
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The Next Wave
More importantly I do not think agricultural economists have
given enough thought to the likely sectoral impact of the
next wave. This is likely to involve:
Cuts in MWD input into developing and maintaining the
provincial infrastructure, particularly where this
activity does not generate commercial returns.
A major shift in information, training and advisory
service costs onto individual or industry users. Because
the agricultural sector is a relatively high user of
government-sourced services of this kind, it will be the
main victim of the change.
Reductions of research activity into new products,
production techniques, Bnd markets. The form of
organisation in the agricultural sector, based as it is
on the family-farm concept, means that the sector is not
well placed to compensate for cuts in those sorts of
services.
It is time to get away from simplistic theory and catchy
political sloganeering about corporatisation. Careful study
shows it up to be a badly though out process that was
implemented back to front and that benefited the better off
sectors of society. At a very minimum we should learn from
the past and not compound the error in the future through
further rounds of corporatisation. In addition, we can
reintroduce proper service requirements and public scrutiny
mechanisms on the corporations that have been created.
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MARKET DIVERSIFICATION AND RISK IN NEW ZEALAND
EXPORT LAMB MARKETS 1
R.G. Ansel1 2 and S.K. Martin
Lincoln College, Canterbury, New Zealand
SUMMARY
This paper evaluates the export lamb diversification scheme
established by the New Zealand Meat Producers' Board and
considers the implication of the policy for variability in
producer returns. By using simple measures of market
diversification, it is concluded that the policy has been
successful both in reducing dependence on the United Kingdom
market, and in diversifying lamb exports across a number of
markets.
However, diversification of lamb exports appears to have been
associated with increasing levels of risk, as measured by the
variability in returns received. Therefore, alternative
allocation procedures which minimise risk were considered, and
the implications of such risk minimisation for the level of
diversification commented on.
Key Words: Lamb exports, diversification, concentration, risk,
optimal allocation, quadratic programming.
INTRODUCTION
Initially fuelled by a desire to expand New Zealand's export lamb
markets, and then faced by a fear of drastic falls in demand as a
result of the united Kingdom joining the EEC, the New Zealand
Meat Producers' Board, in 1966, initiated a formal scheme to
diversify the markets to which New Zealand export lamb was being
sent. This was achieved through government legislation in the
form of the Meat Export Control Amendment Act of 1966, and
provided that a target percentage of lamb be exported to markets
other than the united Kingdom. Levies were imposed to penalise
those unable to achieve these targets. Target percentages were
set at 10 per cent for the 1966/67 year, and were gradually
l The authors are indebted to their colleagues, Professor
Tony Zwart, Mr Bert Ward and Dr Alistair McArthur for their
constructive advice, assistance and criticism during this
research.
2NoW with the Reserve Bank of New Zealand, P.O. Box 2498,
Wellington.
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increased to 32 per cent by 1979/80 when the scheme was formally
suspended.
Such market diversification has also been practised in a number
of other New Zealand industries in the past. The techniques for
aChieving targets have varied, but the objective appeared to be
similar in each case; that is, to reduce the dependence on a
single export market. Given the popularity of such schemes, it
would seem to be imperative to evaluate them in terms of their
stated objectives, and to consider some of the consequences of
successful diversification policies.
In this paper, the export lamb diversification scheme established
by the New Zealand Meat Producers' Board is evaluated in this
way, and the implications of the policy for variability in
producer returns is examined.
MARKET DIVERSIFICATION OVER TIME
The simplest method of evaluating the lamb diversification scheme
is to determine whether export performance exceeded the targeted
proportions envisaged. By this criterion, the scheme must be
regarded as successful since performance did indeed exceed the
targets in all but four years.
Alternatively, the proportion of lamb exported to the United
Kingdom market over time can be calculated, and a jUdgement made
on whether dependence on this market has been reduced. It can be
seen from Figure 1 that over 90 per cent of New Zealand lamb
exports in 1964 were destined for the United Kingdom. However,
by 1984 just over 20 per cent of total lamb exports were being
sent to this market. Whether such a reduction in dependence on
the United Kingdom could have occurred without the lamb export
diversification scheme is open to speculation. On balance
though, it seems reasonable to conclude that the scheme was, at
the very least, partially responsible for reducing the dependence
of lamb exports on the United Kingdom market.
Although lamb was successfully diverted from the United Kingdom
market, the possibility that dependence on one market was traded
off for dependence on another market should not be discounted.
The extent to which the product normally destined for the United
Kingdom market is diverted to a range of markets rather than
another single market can be appropriately encapsulated in a
market concentration index. A simple market concentration index
for a particular year is given by
(1)
where C is the market concentration index, and
X. is proportion of exports of the commodity (quantity) to
1 market i
This particular index was also used by Gould (1985) when he
examined market diversification of total New Zealand exports.
This measure not only takes into account the number of markets
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exported to, but the proportion of exports sent to these markets.
Hence, a market is considered more diversified if it sends 5 per
cent of its total exports to each of its 20 markets rather than
90 per cent to one market and the remaining 10 per cent to the 19
other markets. The value of the market concentration index, c,
can range from close to 0.00 when markets are highly diversified
to 1.00 when all product is exported to one market. Indices were
calculated for each year over a 20 year period from 1964, and the
results plotted in Figure~. This shows that not only did the
dependence of lamb exports on the united Kingdom market lessen,
but diverted product was spread around a number of markets.
Therefore, by this criterion also, it must be concluded that New
Zealand has sUbstantially diversified its export lamb markets.
LEVELS OF RISK OVER TIME
Lamb market diversification has obviously been successful in
reducing dependence on the United Kingdom market and in spreading
significant quantities of product across a number of markets.
However, it is not clear whether there were any disadvantages
associated with the policy which are not evident in the more
crude measures of evaluation considered above. In order to
investigate this possibility further, parallels were drawn with
the literature on financial markets, where portfolio
diversification, which is analogous to market diversification,
has long been a source of considerable interest to financial
analysts.
In the financial literature, the simple concentration index, C,
which was used above, would be referred to as a measure of naive
diversification. The so-called naivety is said to arise because
the measure merely computes the extent to which the number of
markets (appropriately weighted) increases, but takes no account
of the consequences of alternative portfolio diversification
strategies on expected returns and the risk associated with these
returns. That is, a diversification strategy which is
characterised by a concentration index of 0.3 would be considered
to be more successful than one with an index of 0.4, even where
the former strategy was associated with lower real returns and
greater risk than the latter.
Real returns for New Zealand lamb producers (F.O.B. unit price
per kilogram divided by a sheep farmer's input cost index) over
the period 1964 to 1984 are shown in Figure 3. Although these
returns have obviously been quite variable, this graph suggests
that there has probably been no significant increase or decrease
in real returns over time. Hence, it would appear that the lamb
diversification scheme has not been associated with undesirable
consequences in this regard, although it must be recognised that
producer returns are obviously influenced by a number of factors.
Before considering any association between diversification and
risk, a measure of such risk must be determined. In the
financial literature, risk is defined as the variability in
returns exhibited by securities. This has direct parallels to
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lamb markets, where markets exhibiting large variations in
returns would be considered more 'risky' than those with lower
variations. Markowitz (1959) derived a measure of such risk
n 11
Var(rp) = L L W· W.O·.~".i" • J t.~
3 (2)
where Var(rp) is a measure of total portfolio risk
n is the number of securities
o~ is the co-variance of returns of i and j (i=j, j=i)
o~ is the variance of i (j=i)
o~ is the variance of j (i=j)
w~ is the proportion of security i
WJ is the proportion of security j
This measure can be suitably adapted by treating markets as
securities, and the overall distribution of lamb exports as a
portfolio.
Data required to calculate this measure of risk, Var(rp), are
estimates of expected returns for all markets under
consideration. This was obtained by dividing the unit price per
kilogram for lamb (f.o.b.) by a sheep farmers input cost index to
give an approximation of real returns to the producer gross of
processing and handling charges.
The expected variances and co-variances were then calculated
using this data.
The resulting measures of risk are plotted in Figure 4. This
shows that the level of risk associated with the distribution of
lamb exports between markets increased over the 20 year period in
question. Therefore, although the successful diversification of
lamb away from the United Kingdom market does not appear to have
been obviously associated with any increase or decrease in
producer returns, there is evidence to suggest that this
diversification has been associated with increasing levels of
risk as measured by the variability in these returns.
OPTIMAL LAMB EXPORT ALLOCATIONS WHICH MINIMISE RISK
The finance literature would suggest that not only does portfolio
analysis imply diversification, it implies the right kind of
diversification (Markowitz 1959). In other words, if increased
risk is undesirable, then diversification strategies should ~ake
this into account. This paper concludes by considering whether
the overall risk associated with variable returns could have been
reduced by an alternative allocation of lamb exports between
markets. In other words, what market allocation of lamb exports
3A formal derivation is available from the author upon
request.
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would minimise risk sUbject to a given return and/or a maximum
quantity being sent to a particular market?
Quadratic programming algorithms have been found to be useful for
handling problems where such constraints are required, and this
technique is used to evaluate alternative market allocations of
lamb which could have been made in 1984. The quadratic
programming algorithm iteratively minimises a quadratic objective
function sUbject to appropriate linear constraints. In this
case, the objective function would be equation (2). Recall that
" "Var (rp) = L: L: w· w. 0 ..
\.<, j" • 0) "\l
where Var(rp) represents the measure of risk and other variables
are as previously defined.
This function was minimised subject to the constraint that the
overall return for lamb exports be equal to the 1984 level of
$2.02/kg. Alternative constraints on the ability to reallocate
output were then considered. The first two scenarios allowed the
proportion of lamb allocated to each market to increase by 5 per
cent and 10 per cent respectively above the 1984 proportion, if
this was appropriate. The final two scenarios allow for the
possibility of these 5 per cent and 10 per cent increases while
keeping the united Kingdom market proportion at its 1984 level of
26 per cent (which was the lowest proportion the united Kingdom
was supplied over the 1964-84 period).
The results of this optimisation process under these various
scenarios are seen in Table 1. In all scenarios, exports to
Iraq, Papua New Guinea, the U.A.E. and the U.S.A. cease, and
exports to Fiji and Saudi Arabia are reduced. In fact, the
analyses suggest that Iran is the only Middle Eastern market
which should be maintained as a viable export market when
proportion constraints are relaxed.
The total risk associated with these alternative allocation
procedures was calculated and compared with the actual risk
experienced in 1984. This is illustrated in Figure 5. Under
scenario A, where all markets are able to take proportionately 5
per cent more lamb than was taken in 1984, total variance could
be reduced 20 per cent on the level of risk measured in 1984. A
10 per cent relaxation in all markets sees a 31 per cent decrease
on the 1984 level, while in scenarios C and D (5 per cent and 10
per cent relaxation in all markets other than the United Kingdom)
risk could have been reduced by 16 per cent and 27 per cent
respectively.
\ The concentration indices associated with the alternative
\
allocations were also calculated and plotted on Figure 5. These
show that the concentration indices. remain at much the---sa:me"-1:ev-el
~s ris-k-i~--~eQ-uce€h- Thi~ highlights the dax;gers. wl;ich. may b;;,e J-
lnher.en~/) .1;n c,these more, slIJ;lple meas}t1;;es p~ dlverslflcaj:.1 s:m/)(;,'I" / .", ~
4/} /l'h·Y.l-l::1. c-i7-t/ ,.i·'.V..J-{ crn.J!</I.. A4'\a.l (LlJx,-z;:al7....((~-Uvn..(.-') c!::xJ<::X:.-<.Q4'{:>c.-.( '--<"-<.JL--c'i-i:. .1&P c.:-c- t;-"'~.(,;, ,
There are obviously limitations associated with the analysis Ir:~<-->1:_
presented in this paper and appropriate caution should be
exercised when interpreting the results which have been
£, ~ ") .. ' "/712.. ,Voi ..16.• ~ ..~} I?-
/v'Yllj {J.:-£.'L.::v&--)'\.QA~'Vr'1 a..X~7
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TABLE 1
OPTIMAL ALLOCATION OF LAMB EXPORTS UNDER FIVE SCENARIOS
Scenario C. Scenario D.
Scenario A. Scenario B. U.K. at U.K. at
Actual 1984 All 5% All 10% 1984. All 1984. All
Export greater greater else 5% else 10%
Country Proportion than 1984 than 1984 greater. greater.
E. Carib. 0.0000 0.001 0.00000 0.0010 0.00000
Belgium 0.0031 0.003 0.00341 0.0030 0.00341
Canada 0.0127 0.013 0.00449 0.0130 0.01397
Cyprus 0.0024 0.003 0.00264 0.0030 0.00264
Denmark 0.0038 0.004 0.00000 0.0040 0.00196
Fij i 0.0080 0.007 0.00000 0.0070 0.00091
France 0.0080 0.008 0.00880 0.0080 0.00880
Fr. Polynesia 0.0013 0.00.1 0.00143 0.0010 0.00143
Germany FDR 0.0170 0.018 0.01870 0.0190 0.01870
Greece 0.0243 0.025 0.02673 0.0250 0.02673
Iran 0.3234 0.340 0.35570 0.3400 0.35570
Iraq 0.0001 0.000 0.00000 0.0000 0.00000
Italy 0.0101 0.011 0.01111 0.0110 0.01110
Japan 0.0427 0.045 0.04697 0.0450 0.04697
Jordan 0.0107 0.011 0.01177 0.0110 0.01177
Netherlands 0.0016 0.002 0.00000 0.0020 0.00000
P. New Guinea 0.0142 0.000 0.00000 0.0000 0.00000
Saudi Arabia 0.0251 0.008 0.00000 0.0240 0.00000
Singapore 0.0029 0.003 0.00319 0.0030 0.00319
Switzerland 0.0029 0.003 0.00319 0.0030 0.00319
U.A.E. 0.0043 0.000 0.00000 0.0000 0.00000
United Kingdom 0.2505 0.265 0.27555 0.2505 0.25050
U.S.A. 0.0139 0.000 0.00000 0.0000 0.00000
Other Countries 0.2173 0.228 0.22633 0.2280 0.23903
Total 1.0000 1.000 1.00000 1.0000 1.00000
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presented. For example, in the quadratic programming problem, it
was assumed that all markets exhibit perfectly elastic demand
curves up to their quantitative constraints, that there is
control of the distribution of lamb destined for overseas
markets, and that lamb is an homogenous product.
However, the research does suggest that attention should be paid
to both stated objectives and acceptable tradeoffs when
initiating and evaluating such schemes, and that the measures
used for evaluation should appropriately reflect these objectives
and tradeoffs.
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SI:mEPLAN AND t.lSER PAYS 1
Y-S. Chiao
Ruakura Agricultural Research Centre, Private .Bag, Hamilton
This study examines the benefits of Sheeplan and its redevelopnent
by measuring changes in consumer and producer (commercial sheep farmers)
surplus. A distinction between the immediate incremental gain and the
cumulative gain is recognised, because the genetic improvements stemming
from the use of Sheeplan are inherited from one generation to the ne.~.
The majority of the benefits accrue to producers. A user pays scheme to
charge ram breeders to fully recover the Sheeplan dedevelopnent costs is
bearable to ram breeders and comnercial sheep farmers in the long run.
However, wilen output prices deteriorate the immediate incremental gain
may be small and famers with cash problems may drop out of Sheeplan.
Key words:. Sheeplan, producer and consumer. surplus, user pays,
genetic improvement, incremental gain, cumulative gain.
INrRODUCTION
Selecting rams is an important economic decision for sheep farmers.
Farmers can improve their profitability of sheep farming by using
selection strategies based on characters of economic importance. The
National Flock Recording Scheme (NFRS), introduced in 1967, enabled
farmers to select rams based on a single trait selection scheme. %
Sheeplan, introduced in 1976 to replace NFRS, has enabled farmers to
select rams based on a weighted index of: (1) Number of lambs born or
reared; (2) Lamb weaning weight; (3) Hogget livew-eightj and (4) Hogget
fleece weigh.t.
NFRS and Sheeplan have helped coo:mercial farmers select breeders
and rams. Breeders have also benefited from the selection scheme because
commercial sheep farmers have been willing to pay premiums for Sheeplan
recorded rams over non-recorded rams (Lysaght, 1986). Furthermore tbf>
scheme has improved the genetic merit of the national flock because the
genetic improvement achieved by breeders and sheep farmers is transmitted
to future generations.
Currently VlAF and the Sheeplan C<:nmcil are contemplating a
redevelopment of Sheeplan to be implemented in 1989/90. The improved
scheme would provide higher genetic gain by improving breeding value
accuracy, allOwing for adjustment for non-genetic factors, and increasing
IThis paper is abridged. from the author's "Economic Analysis of Sheeplan
and Its Redevelopment", Economics Division, MAF, Technical Paper 6/86.
% There are t~o traits on which they could select -
reproduction and fleece weight - but both were selected
independentl)- .
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the effectiveness with wnich SheepIan records are used. (Bell, 1985;
Callow, 1986). Due to a policy change toward the commercialisation of
marketable research findings and service (User Pays System), this
redevelopment needs to be financially justifiable.
MAF is planrJUlg to estimate the costs of research, development and
mainta.l1at1Ce of the proposed Sheeplan redevelopment; to assess the
benefits associated with the rsd.evelopnent; and, more iIr.:x>rt...antly, to
identify the beneficiaries a'1d to incorporate a user fee scheme to
recover at least part of the costs, if not to generate profits.
The objective of this study is to estimate the benefits that can be
generated by Sheeplan and its redevelopment. A theoretical model is
developed to measure the changes in economic welfare of those affected
in the sheepneat and wool markets. The concepts of consumer surplus and
producer surplus form the foundation of this analysis.
loiRO ARE mE BENEFICIARIES
Two grolA.-ps are affected by Sheeplan: (l) producers of sheepneat and
woe-I, including the direct users of the scheme, (ram breeder.s) ~ and. the
indirect users, (commercial sheep farmers), and (2) consuners of prooucts
such as sheepneat and wool fibres. The physical benefits of the scheme
come in the form of more output per unit of input (or less input per unit
of output) and/or improved output quality. If the marketplace can absorb
all of the future flew of the increased output at a constant price,
computing the benefits is straightfor",.;aro. However, markets rarely
behave this way. Oftentimes, market price's of a product will drop due to
a supply increase, a·ther things being tnlchanged. In this marmer r
consumers w~ll also benefit from the scha~.
The henefit is the sum of the net consumer surplus gain and the net-
producer su...."l~...lS gain. Because over 90 percent of New Zealand. sheepneat
and wool are e.~rted every year, the foreign consumer surplus ga.~.n has
to be subtracted from the total consumer surplus change in order to
derive the New Zea.1ElI.ld consumer surplus gain. Therefore, the net New
Zealand gain due to the scheme is the sum of the increased producer
surplus plus the New Zea.land consumer surplus gain.
The gain in producer surplus can be used to approximate the upper
limit of the charges that users of the scheme would be prepared. to bear.
The change in benefits to commercial sheep farmers, (the indirect
Sheeplan users), represents the upper limit of their aggregate
willingness to pay for the service provided by the ram breeders. AIthough
the direct users of Sheeplan are ram breeders and. charges should be made
aga5..nst them, the ultimate users are commercial sheep farms whose
i.ndirect demand for the service of Sheeplan drives the ram breeders'
demand for Sheeplan. It is those benefits to ccmmercial sheep farmers en
wilich this st:.zdy is focused.
This analysis considers the farm-gate market as the final goods
market. Thus, the value added in the processing and retail markets are
excluded.
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ECONCMIC FRA1'1EWORK
A ntmiber of researchers (e.g. Blyth, 1983a; Laing and Zlo.-a.rt, 1983;
Shaw, 1986) have modelled the complex and dynamic system of the New
Zealand sheepneat and wool industries. This study simplifies the system
by collapsing it into a system of three product markets, lamb, mutton
and wool. Each market is described by a demand and a supply function,
with quantities demanded and supplied and own price as the variables. The
respective demand and supply elasticities and. a shift parameter describe
each market.
The supply response of product i in year t can be expressed as:
Qi t = bl dKi t,Si t> (Pi, t-d t,
i=lamb, mutton, wool,
(1 )
lo.nere Qit: t.lJ.e supply quantity of product ~ In year t,
P j • t - 1 : the price of product i in year t-l,
e : the supply elasticity of product i,
Sit : the supply shift of product i in year t due to
Sheeplan,
bit: the aggregated. supply shift of 'product i in year
t due to Sheeplan and all other variables,
collectively denoted as Kit.
Equation (l) can be rewriten as
(2)
where b' i t is the aggregated supply shift of product in year t due to Ki t
(excluding the effect of Sheeplan). Therefore, the net effect of
Sheeplan on supply can be separated from the total supply. The out~
supply shift due to Sheeplan is atributable to two sources, genetic
improvement (g d and change in Sheeplan membership (mt).
(3)
The supplies of lamb, mutton and to.""OOl are assumed to depend on the
previous Year's prices. In Figure I, 8 and 8' are the supply with and
wi thout Sheeplan 1 respectively; D is the demand and 8' is shifted to S by
the factor of s t as a result of Sheeplan, where s t is the percentage
shift in the supply curve OA - OE.
OE
The supply fl.ID.ction without Sheeplan, 8', is (dropping the product
index, for simplicity)
Qt =b' tP t - 1 e ,
and the supply function with Sheeplan, S, is
The demand function, D, is
and the demand elasticity, ~, is equal to lin.
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(4)
( 5)
(6)
The change in prcx:l.ucer surplus (:2 PS) for each year is
A
PS = [A:l:Pz - f (S)d(Q)]
o
E
- [E:l:P 3 - f (S' )d(Q)]
o
(7 )
= (OABP2 - OAH) (OEFPJ - OEG) •
The change in coDSl.nner surplus (!:i CS) for each year is
A E
CS = [ f (D)d(Q) - A:l:Pz] - [f (D)d(Q) - PJE] (8)
o 0
The net change of social benefit for each year ( .6 SB) is the sum of Q PS
and .6 CS,
.6 SB = ~PS + .6 CS
A E A E
=f (D)d(Q) - f (D)d(Q) - J (S)d(Q) + f (S' )d(Q). (9)
o 0 0 0
Figure 1 Supply Shift Resulting from Sheeplan
s
P1 t---~-------f-------i
I~P2l;;?~ ! ~,~
o ------:,:,=-.----J,.A--~--?
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NATURE OF GENETIC IMPROVS1ENT
The heritability of genetic gains and the assumption of a constant
rate of genetic improvement results in high returns to many genetic
research findings. The first gain to a Sheeplan breeder is assumed to be
realised one generation after joining Sheeplan. The generation interval
is assumed to be 3 years. The ram breeder can retain the genetic gain for
severe> 1 generations even if he ceases to subscribe after only one year
in the scheme. For the same reason a cOIlUllercial farmer can retain the
genetic gain for several generations even if he only purchases Sheeplan
recorded rams once.
At any time t, the genetic gain (gt> is the average of that of the
ram (gr ) and that of the ewe (ge ). It also reflects the ctIDulative
t t
sum of the incremental gain in Past years and the gain in the current
year, as shown in Figure 2. The former is called incremental gain (gI)
and the latter is called cumulative gain (gc). If the breeder remains in
the scheme, the cumulative gain will accumulate over time while the
incremental gain remains constant. Note that the incremental gain is
actually the result of the sire's genetic gain obtained one generation
ago. The key is that breeders and farmers will always have positive
cumulative gains while the incremental gain disappears if quitting the
scheme. If the gain is not heritable, however, the cumulative gain will
also disappear.
Algebrically, the gain in year t can be expressed as:
for t>3 (10)
where
=0, otherwise;
g e =g, - 1 = (g r + g e ) /2
t t-l t-l
(11 )
(12)
and g 5 is the expected annual rate of production increase of wnich the
I
derivation will be discussed in detail in the following section.
Substitute (11) and (12) into (10) ,
g, = 0.5[ (t-3)gs + 0.5(gr + ge )],
I t-l t-l
and after repetitive substitutions, we have
s, = 1: (l/2) gr
i=1 t+l-i
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(13 )
(14)
t
= r (1/2) (t-2-i)gs
i =1 I
And (3) can be rewritten as
t
St = r (l/2) (t-2-i)gs * IDL
isi I
=0, otherwise.
Figure 2 Nature of Genetic Gain
for t>3
(15)
(16)
Stop Shee"plan enrollment:Sire
Ram
i.
,
Rnnn
T+~ T+5 1+6 T+7
year
Commercial
E~e
g.
,
o 0-------T~+-3:---!.::T-+~4:""---JT+5
Stop Purchasing
Recorded Ram
DD
T+6 T+7
:rear
Lamb
g.
CD ~ u[]--------l::-T~+3~-J.,.T,.i+-4L--T+5 T+6 T +71...---- year
AIternatively J g t can be expressed as the sum of the incremental gain
(gI ) and the cummulative gains (gc ):
t t
(17)
where gI =gI =O,5gs •
t I
(18)
The cumulative gain (gc is simply the difference betlo<een (15) and (18).
t
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PARAME'TER USED
Genetic parameters
Bywater (1986) assumed. that ram breeders are 70% effective in using
the recorded information and derived the genetic gain per generation
parameters with index selection tmder Sheeplan for Number of lamb born
(NLB), Weaning Weight (WWt) and Fleece Weight (FWt). The reason that
breeders are not 100% effective in using the recorded information is
because they nonnaly select rams based on not only the recorded
information but also other physical traits as well.
Callow (1986) assumed the effectiveness in using recorded
information under the current Sheeplan scheme is 50%, and computed the
benefits of the proposed redevelopnent based on the assumption that it
will increase genetic gains by 40% as a result of more accurate
selection decisions and by another 30% as a result of improved
effectiveness in using Sheeplan records. Table 1 shows the expected gain
per generation per ewe under NFRS (ST) 7 current Sheeplan (Sd and its
redevelopnent, assuming 50 percent and 70 percent effectiveness in using
Sheeplan record at present.
Table 1: Expected Genetic Gain per Generation per Ewe
Plan Number of
Lamb Born
(no)
ST NFRS .0138
SI current Sheeplan .0314
50% effectiveness
S 1 redevelopnent .0571
Weaning
Weight
(kg)
.4133
.7522
Fleece
Weight
(kg)
.0506
.0255
.0464
.0800 1.0530
and Callow (1986).
S 1 current Sheeplan
70% effectiveness
S r redevelopnent
Source: Bywater (1986)
.0440 .5786 .0357
.0650
The above parameters were used to compute the expected annual rate of
incre.'llental increase of sheepneat and wool production. The expected
annual rate of incremental increase of sheepneat under Sheeplan is
derived by multiplying the difference between Sx and ST of WWt by the
NLB gain and then dividing by the average carcass weight (AVW) and by the
generation interval (GI). The expected annual rate of incremental
increase of wool production under Sheeplan is computed in the same waj-.
The average carcass weight of lamb is asstmled to be 13. 34kg and the
average wool production is assumed to be 5. 37kg per head per year.
g 5 ( sheepneat )
I
= [I~"'Wt (S d - WWt (S T )J *NLB
AVW * GI (19)
The production and price data needed to estimate the benefits
associated with the current Sheeplan are mostly readily available. On the
other hand, to measure the benefits associated with the redevelopment of
Sheeplan, requires forecasting production of sheepmeat and wool, and
56
their prices, up to the turn of the century. Given the volatility of the
sheepneat and wool markets such a forecasting exercise would have very
high errors, even if it were possible. Alternatively, the issue can be
addressed by asking what would be the benefits and costs if the
redevelopment had been implemented in 1976, while assuming that the
production of sheepmeat and wool and their respective prices remain the
same as tmder Sheeplan. The expected annual rates of incremental increase
of sheepnea.t and wool production tmder redevelopment have been computed
on this basis.
Table 2: Expected Annual Rate of Production Increase (gs )
I
Plan Sheepneat Wool
(% / per year)
Current Sheplan
50% effectiveness
Redevelopnent
Current Sheeplan
70% effectiveness
Redevelopment
Sheeplan Membership
1.040
1.906
1.460
2.689
-0.15670
-0.02639
-0.09350
0.09i36
The proportion of sire producing ewes recorded under NFRS increased
on average 1. 25% annually between 1967 and 1975, although total
enrollment showed signs of levelling off in 1974 and 1975 (Bywater,
1986). The proportion of sire producing ewes recorded tmder Sheeplan
increased on average 1.54% annually between 1976 and 1985, although
again, total enrollment slowed down in 1984 and'1985 (B)'loIater, 1986). It
is assumed in this study that the increase of enrollment rate between
1976 and 1984 was due to the introduction of Sheeplan in 1976. Therefore
the membership of Sheeplan at time t (md can be expressed as:
mt = .125 + .0154t. (20)
Since genetic gain accrues three years after joining the scheme,
equations (16) and (3) can be rewTitten as:
t
St = r (1/2) (t-2-i)gs * [(.125 + .0154(t-2-i)J (21)
i =1 I
Finally, (21) can be substituted into (2) to derive the supply at any
year t as a function of the following parameters: shift effect excluding
Sheeplan (b' it), production elasticity (e) ,incremental genetic gain due
to Sheeplan (gs ) and time (t).
I
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Economic Parameters
Laing and. Zwart (1983) and Shaw (1986) estimated the supply
responses of lamb, mutton and wool production. In general, the estimated
supply elasticities are all relatively low, ranging from 0 to 0.20
(ignoring negative estimates). Several trials based on different
elasticity values were performed to test the sensititivity of the
estimates of the constuner and producer gains. As there were only
insignificant differences, one set of supply elasticities was chosen for
further analysis: 0.20 for lamb, 0.11 for mutton and 0.08 for wool.
Blyth (l983b) estimated the export demand elasticity for New
Zealand sheepneat as being -9.50 (high), -6.5 (medium) and -3.5 (low).
This study assumes identical demand elasticity for lamb, mutton and
wool. All three values will be used to estimate the benefits associated
with the scheme.
Since the demand is much more elastic than supply for all three
products the producer surplus gain will be larger than the consumer
surplus gain, justifYing the need for a user pays system.
The time SPan of the study covers the .period from 1976 to 1991. Data
on production and prices from 1976 to 1986 are taken from various issues
of New Zealand Agricultural Statistics (MAF) and Annual Review of the
Sheep and Beef Industry (NZMWB' ES). All three products showed conunon
trends during the period of a significant increase of production and a
drop in real prices. The forecasted sheep numbers and lamb and mutton
slaughter numbers from 1987 to 1991 are from "Likely Trends of Sheep and
Beef Cattle Numbers, 1986-1991" (NZMWB'ES, 1986).
Three sets of prices for lamb, mutton and wool for 1987 to 1991 are
used:
(1) extrapolations of the linear trend, (trend);
(2) means of prices between 1976 and 1986, (optimistic); and
(3) the 1986 levels, (pessimistic).
All prices and costs are computed at the March quarter 1986 prices.
Additional on-farm record:i.ng costs under Sheeplan and its
redevelopnent are assumed to be $1.92 per ewe. (based on Bywater, 19~6).
The number of recorded ewes was 203,415 in 1976.
COST AND BENEFIT ANALYSIS
Costs
No estimate of costs pertaining to the research and developnent of
the current Sheeplan is available. Therefore the internal rate of return
(IRR) and the net present value (N"PV) are computed only for the
redevelopment.
The capital costs of the research and developnent of the
redevelopment of Sheeplan are assumed to be $636,000. The extension costs
for the promotion and extension and advisory service are assumed to be
$450,000 per annum for three years during the planning period.
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Table 3: Costs Summary of Sheeplan Redevelopnent ($)
R&D
Capital
R&D
Extension
OPERATION
PER ANNUM
Processing 475,000
Ext and R&D 72,000
Maintenance 119,000
Subtotal 666,000
source: Callow and Clarke (1986) and
Lysaght (personal comrmmication)
635,000.
750,000
600,000
After the implementation, the amlUal opearting costs are assumed to
be $666,000, of which $475,000 is processing costs, $72,000 is the
on-going extension and R&D costs and $119,000 is technical maintenance
costs. The net present value of total costs of the proposed scheme is
$5.7 million.
Benefits
The changes in consumer and producer surpluses for lamb, mutton and
wool markets were estimated for both the current Sheeplan, and the
scenario that redevelopment had been introduced. in 1976. The New Zealand.
constmler surplus gain is asStmled to share 10% of the total consumer
surplus gain, because only 10% of the sheepneat and wool are constmled
domestically.
This section concentrates on the "average" case in which parameters
are set at the folowing values:
(l) output prices _... "trend" prices;
(2) export demand elasticities - medium (-6.5 for all);
(3) supply elasticities -- 0.20 for lamb, 0.11 for mutton and
0.08 for WOOl;
(4 ) effectiveness in using records - 50%; and
(5) ann~l rate of membership increase -- 1.54%.
The costs were subtracted from the annual benefits to compute the
IRR and NPV (using a discount rate 10%). Table 4 showes the benefits of
Sheeplan and its redevelopment for the "average" case.
The first benefit of the scheme accrues three years after the
introduction of SheepIan. Afterwards benefits grow until 1986, when the
prices of lamb and mutton were expected to drop by 40% (Table A. 1), The
net present value of change in producer surplus due to Sheeplan .
redevelopment ( $13.7 million) lo'ould be more than double that of the
current scheme ($5.9 million). The producer surplus gain outweighs the
consumer surplus gain by more than 26 to one, suggesting the user pays
system is justifiable. The average gross benefits before paying the user
fees are $1.50 per Sheeplan recorded ewe and $3.48 under the
redevelopment. After fully recovering the developnent and operating
costs, the new scheme still generate a net return of $1.70 per recorded
ewe. The internal rate of return to the Sheeplan redevelopment is 27%.
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Table 4: Return to Sheeplan and the Proposed
Redevelopnent ("Average" Case)
Benefits
Net Present Value of Change in
Producer Surplus ($In)
Net Present Value of Change in
Consumer Surplus ($In)
Net Present Value of Change in
Total Surplus ($m)
Gross Benefits / per
Recorded ewe ($ )
Net Present Value of
Return ($m)
Return /per
Recorded ewe ($)
Internal Rate of Return (%)
Incremental vs Cumulative Benefits
Current
5.9
0.2
6.1
1.50
N/A
N/A
N/A
Proposed
13.7
0.3
14.0
3.48
7.0
1.70
27
High NPV's of the change in producer surplus show that the sheep
industry as a whole benefits from Sheeplan and its redevelopnent. The
average benefit per recorded ewe ($1.50) is higher than the proposed
1986-87 levy level ($1.30 per ewe). But in 1986 a number of breeders
have dropped out of Sheeplan. After examining the two components of the
total producer surplus change (Table A.2), it is evident that the high
producer surplus gain is primarily due to the cumulative gain. The
cumulative gain significantly outweighs the incremental gain in every
year. In 1986 the incremental producer surplus gain of joining Sheeplan
is negative (-$306,000) while the $491,000 cumulative producer surplus
gain can be obtained without joining Sheeplan, although joining will
assure a higher cumulative gain in future years.
Many factors affect a breeder's decision about whether to continue
subscribing to the Sheeplan service. Their current cash flows may play an
important role in deciding whether to continue. Some breeders evaluate
the benefits of joining Sheeplan only by the incremental gain and do not
necessarily consider the future gain. As a result, some have dropped out
of Sheplan during a year of reduced cash flows.
SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS
A series of sensitivity analysis were performed with respect to the
uncertain parameters:
(1) output prices,
(2) demand elasticities, and
(3) effectiveness in using Sheeplan records;
and with respect to the membership parameter.
Only one parameter at a time "'"as changed from the "average" case
(see pages 14-15) in order to isolate the effect of each change. Results
are surmarised below:
(1) Output Prices: The differences between the "average" and the
pessimistic cases are less significant than that between the optimistic
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and the "average" cases. Since the "average" case assumes that prices
continue to decline, the estimated benefits are likely to be understated
if prices discontinue their dOwTIw~rd trend.
(2) Demand Elasticities: Higher demand elasticity corresponds to higher
benefits. Since the export demand elasticity facing a small open economy
is relatively high, the estimated benefits are expected to be closer to
those found using an elasticity of -9.5.
(3): Effectiveness in using Records: Improving effectiveness i.n using
Sheeplan records and increasing Sheeplan enrollment have great potential
to increase the return to the current scheme.
Table 5, summarising the above results, provides the lower and the
upper bounds of the estimated benefits.
Table 5: Upper and Lower Bounds of the Estimated Benefits
Current Proposed
Benefits Lower Upper Lower Upper
NPV of PS ($In) 4.0 12.6 11.1 19.9
NPV of CS ($In) 0.4 0.4 0.6 0.5
NWof SB ($In) 4.4 13.0 11.7 20.4
Gross Benefit /per 1.01 3.22 2.82 4.29
Recorded Ewe ($)
NPV of Return ($In) N/A N/A 4.7 13.4
Return/ per N/A N/A 1.05 2.79
Recorded Ewe ($)
IRR (%) N/A N/A 21 35
USER PAYS CONSIDERATION
This study does not identify the economic benefits to ram breeders
because of time and data constraints. Instead, the major goal of this
study is to estimate the benefits to coonnercial sheep farmers, which can
be used to approximate the upper limit of the charge that users of the
scheme would be prepared to bear. The reason for this is that if
commercial sheep farmers are not willing to pay for the service provided
by ram breeders, ram breeders will not be able to pay a penny for the
Sheeplan service.
Benefits to ram breeders can be used to approximate the upper lindt
the Sheeplan Council can charge ram breeders. Similarly, benefits to
commercial sheep farmers can be used to approximate the upper limit ram
breeders can chagre commercial sheep fa.~ers for the ser~ice. P~alised
charges become ram breeders' profit. Therefore, benefits to commercial
sheep farmers can also be used to approximate the upper limit ram
breeders are willing to pay for the Sheeplan service.
The results of the analysis from the previous sections indicate that
the Sheeplan redevelopment is financially justifiable, since tot~l cefore
charge economic beenefits to commercial sheep farmers (between $11.1 and
519.9 million) exceeds the costs of Sheeplan redevelopment (85.7
million). Thus, a user pays scheme to reocver the Sheeplan redevelopment
costs is feasible.
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Before charge benefits to sheep farmers are estimated to be between
$2.82 and $4.29 per recorded ewe, wnich approximate the upper limit
farmers are willing to pay to the breders. In turn, this figure also
approximate the upper limit the breeders can charge the sheep farmers
and, thus, are willing to pay for the Sheeplan service. However, if total
benefits are broken down to the inmediate incremental gains and the
future cumulative gains the former is smaller than the latter and may
even be negative. In fact in 1986 the incremental benefits to producers
are less than the user charge (possibly negative); therefore some ram
breeders with cash flow problems are dropping out of Sheeplan.
Clearly, if the Sheeplan Council were to charge this upper limit
am01.mt to ram breeders, ram breeders, then, would charge the same amolIDt
to commercial farmers, leaving no benefits to breeders or sheep farmers.
On the other extreme, if the Sheeplan service were to be free of charge
to breeders, it would be up to these breeders to decide how much they
would charge commercial sheep farmers for using their service. Under this
circumstance, the breeder's charge to sheep fanners could range,
theoretically, from none to the upper limi.t. The exact charge would be
determined by demand. and supply in the breeder's service market.
Regardless what amotmt breeders would charge sheep farmers, both would
stand no worse off than had there been no Sheeplan service.
The finding indicates that a user pays scheme to reocver all the
Sheeplan redevelopnent costs is bearable to ram breeders and commercial
sheep farmers if total long term benefits, not just the immediate
incremental benefits, are considered by the breeders and farmers. The
cost of Sheeplan redevelopnent is estimated to be between $1.50 and $1.80
per ewe. After paying the full costs, the industry is still left with
net benefits between $5.4 to $14.2 million or between $1.05 to $2.79 per
recorded ewe. This study made no attempt to examine the distribution of
these net benefits between ram breeders and commercial sheep fanners.
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Table A.1: Benefits of Sheeplan and Its Redevelopment ($'000)*
Current Proposed Difference
~pS 6CS 6 SB 6ps ~CS 6SB Lips 6CS Li SB
76 -399 0 -399 -399 0 -399 0 0 0
77 -409 0 -409 -409 0 -409 0 0 0
78 -418 0 -418 -418 0 -418 0 0 0
79 40 10 51 718 25 744 678 14 692
80 697 27 725 2497 66 2564 1799 39 1839
81 1160 38 1198 3483 90 3573 2323 51 2375
82 1781 50 1832 4925 117 5043 3144 67 3211
83 1952 57 2010 5233 131 5364 3280 73 3354
84 2361 64 2426 6035 145 6180 3673 80 3753
85 2645 72 2717 6793 163 6956 4148 91 4239
86 184 27 212 2028 76 2105 1844 48 1893
87 1973 52 2025 5365 122 5487 3392 69 3462
88 1503 48 1551 4479 114 4594 2976 66 3042
89 1313 44 1358 4097 106 4204 2784 62 2846
90 1062 39 1101 3622 96 3718 2559 57 2616
91 906 35 942 3307 89 3397 2401 53 2454
* the "average" case
~PS: consumer surplus, see equation (8)
6CS: producer surplus, see equation (7)
~SB: social benefits ::LPS +LlCS
Table A.2: Decomposition of Producer Surplus Gain:
Incremental Gain and Cumulative Gain ($' 000 )
Producer Surplus Change
Current Proposed Difference
Inc. Cum. Total Inc. Cum. Total Inc. Cum. Total
76 -399 0 -399 -399 0 -399 0 0 0
77 -409 0 -409 -409 0 -409 0 0 0
78 -418 0 -418 -418 0 -418 0 0 0
79 40 0 40 718 0 718 678 0 678
80 41 656 697 802 1695 2497 760 1039 1799
81 87 1072 1160 860 2622 3483 773 1549 2323
82 218 1562 1781 1168 3757 4925 949 2194 3144
83 230 1721 1952 1177 4055 5233 947 2333 3280
84 323 2038 2361 1358 4676 6035 1035 2637 3673
85 384 2261 2645 1538 5254 6793 1154 2993 4148
86 -306 491 184 200 1828 2028 507 1336 1844
87 173 1799 1973 1103 4261 5365 930 2462 3392
88 35 1467 1503 847 3631 4479 811 2164 2976
89
-24 1338 1313 732 3365 4097 756 2027 2784
90 -100 1163 1062 592 3030 3622 693 1866 2559
91 -151 1057 906 497 2810 3307 648 1752 2401
Inc.: incremental benefits
Cum.: cumulative benefits
Total:LiPS from Table A.1
64

RISK BALANCING: A PRELIMINARY EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
FOR THE NEW ZEALAND SHEEP AND BEEF SECTOR
D. de B. Galwey & P. J. O'Neil
Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries
ABSTRACT
Risk is an integral part of the decision making process
and has received considerable exposure in the
literature. A hypothesis tested with some success in
the United states suggests that apart from the general
business risk (market, climate etc) involved in the
initial investment and subsequent production response,
there is an additional element to risk that originates
from the financing decision.
The risk balancing hypothesis suggests that business
risk and financial risk could possibly be trade-offs in
overall risk behaviour. Preliminary investigation
offers some support for the hypothesis on New Zealand
sheep and beef farms, particularly over the period
1959-72. Increasing levels of Government assistance
over the latter period of the analysis, 1973-85,
suggest a change in total risk bearing behaviour.
Key Words: Business Risk, Financial Risk, Risk
Balancing, Regression Analysis, Sheep and
Beef Farms.
Introduction
Risk is an inherent element of the commercial decision
making process . Agriculture, while being subj ect to
_the general vagaries of the market place is also subject
to a range of additional risks that influence the
biological system, such as climate, disease and pests.
A wide range of public and private mechanisms have
evolved in many countries to reduce the risk faced by
agricultural producers.
Rostamizadeh (1985) gives a good summary of the
strategies available for risk management in New Zealand
agriculture. For example statutory stabilizatioL
schemes (in particular' wool, meat and dairy) were
designed to minimise the impact of fluctuating product
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prices on farm incomes. 1 However through the middle
1970's to 1985, increasing amounts of public funds were
inj ected into the sector, as price stabilization was
increasingly supplemented by income support (SMPs and
input subsidies). The taxpayer accordingly assumed an
increasing share of the market risk facing agricultural
producers in New Zealand.
The current Government's drive for economic efficiency
necessitates that resource allocation be dictated by
true market signals. Accordingly, the movement towards
non-intervention has seen the effective rates of
assistance for agriculture declining from a high of
314% in 1984 to an estimated - 1% in 1987. (Situation
and Outlook for New Zealand Agriculture, (1987) pp.
9-11. )
The responsibility for risk management now lies with
the individual or the sector upon which the collective
benefits are conferred.
A better understanding of the impact of risk in the
decision making process of sheep and beef farmers, and
the evolution of management mechanisms, both private
and collective, will be of increasing interest to
policy analysts 2 .
Objectives of the study
To test for the New Zealand sheep and beef sector, the
risk balancing hypothesis developed by Gabriel and
Baker (1980) and -applied with some success to the
aggregate United States agricultural sector.
1 See Zanetti et al (1975)
background to stabilization
that time.
for a
policies
review and
enacted at
2 As far as the authors are aware, the only New
Zealand quantitative study of agricultural
investment that includes a risk variable is that of
Laing (1982) who used the variance of price as a
measure. Risk has however been recognised by our
practitioners of cost-benefit analysis, for
example, Shepherd (1970), and Bell (1977).
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Concepts
Risk and uncertainty while often used synonymously, are
theoretically distinguished (Knight, 1921) such that in
cases where probabilities can be assigned to outcomes
then the conditions are referred to as risk. When this
cannot be achieved the situation is referred to as
uncertainty.
At a theoretical level, the incorporation of risk
parameters into a profit maximisation framework
produces first order conditions where the marginal
factor cost (input price) is equal to the value of the
marginal expected product less a marginal risk
deduction that depends on the utility function and the
marginal variance of revenue. (Anderson, Dillon, and
Hardaker (1977), pp.161-169.)
In decision making analysis, models incorporating a
risk component have greater "predictive" power. Lin,
Dean and Moore (1974), found that an expected utility
specification outperformed profit maximisation models.
Risk, as it is defined in studies such as those
referred to above, would in the context of this study
be defined as business risk.
(a) Business Risk
Business risk is defined as the risk inherent in
the firm independent of the way it is
financed (Gabriel & Baker(1980) p. 560). It
is generally reflected by the variability of
net operating surplus and accordingly an
appropriate measure of relative dispersion is
the coefficient of variation (standard
deviation divided by the mean).
(b) Financial Risk
Financial risk is defined to be the added
variability of net cashflows of the owners of
equity that results from fixed debt servicing
charges. With increasing levels of debt, the
possibility of cash insolvency and business failure
also increases.
To illustrate these concepts, the following example,
taken from Van Horne (1983, pp. 358-359) is presented.
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Consider two firms, A and B who are identical in every
respect except that B has borrowed $300,000 at 10
percent interest. Operating incomes are assumed to be
subjective random variables with a mean of $80,000 and
standard deviation of $40,000.
Both firms are exposed to the same degree of business
risk, with a coefficient of variation of 0.50
(40,000/80,000). However, because firm B has an
interest committment of $30,000 its expected earnings
before tax are $50,000, accordingly the relative
dispersion is 0.50 for firm A, and 0.8 for firm B.
Because firm A has no external financing it has by
definition no financial risk, while firm B has a
financial risk factor of 0.3, (0.8 - 0.5).
Graphically the case is shown in Figure I, where the
degree of dispersion is equivalent for both firms, but
the expected value of earnings for A is greater than B.
Figure 1: Probability Distribution
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of Expected
Probability
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Risk Balancing
It is now appropriate to develop an algebraic
representation of the concepts covered so far.
Let:
0-1 = standard deviation of net cash flows in the
absence of debt financing.
()2 = standard deviation of net cash flows with debt
financing.
ex = expected net cash flows in the abscense of
borrowing.
I = debt servicing commitments.
Business risk (BR), can then be expressed as:
BR = (Ji
cx
- (1)
- (2)
Financial risk (FR), being the incremental risk due
to capital borrowings, is thus defined as:
FR = 0-;
cx-I
which can be re-expressed as:
FR == (}2 -0;:
(cx-I)
• (I)
(cx-I)
- (3)
Risk balancing is in the words of Gabriel and Baker (pg
561):
"the adjustment in the components of total risk (ie
business and financial risk) that results from an
exogenous shock to the existing balance. This shock is
to be represented by a change in business risk and
viewed within the context of a total risk constraint".
To illustrate this, total risk (TR) is the summation of
business risk and financial risk, ie:
TR == BR + FR
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-(4)
A total risk constraint3 with an upper limit of)j is
defined, thus:
TR ~ P -(5)
Consider the case where there is no leverage induced
change in business risk (ie ai, = er2) then according to
the definition,
TR =
cx
+ ~.I
cx(cx I)
- ( 6 )
Since the term for financial risk includes the business
risk component (O'i/cx) it is then directly influenced
by it. If ~1 increases and there is no slack in the
risk constraint, financial risk will also rise thereby
triggering a risk adjustment to comply with the
constraint. This adjustment, as Gabriel and Baker note
may involve a production or an investment or a
financing decision, or all three.
This adjustment is what is referred to as risk
balancing.
Model Specification
To test the risk balancing hypothesis in the New
Zealand context, the ratio I/(CX-I) in which the
financial risk adjustment takes placer was regressed
against a set of likely explanatory variables.
In the first instance, the model tested was:
I I (CX- I ) t = f (CVt -1 , it-1, Tr t -1 , Pt -1 ) - ( 7 )
-where:
CV = 3 year moving coefficient of variation of net
operating surplus (business risk)
3 In an expected utility context, the degree of risk
the decision maker would be willing to take or
avert, would be represented by the "degree of
curvature" of the expected utility function. For
example, see Layand & Walters (1978, pp. 360~362.)
70
i = average cost of debt (= total interest paid)
( total debt )
1T= profitability of assets (= profit before tax)
( total farm capital)
P = land price index.
Apart from business risk, the average cost of debt,
profitability of assets and changes in land prices (as
it effects equity and have borrowing potential) are all
assumed to impact on the financial risk.
In terms of the basic risk balancing equation (6), one
would expect ~ priori that business risk is inversely
related to the financial risk component. That is, one
would expect a negative coefficient on ev. Similarly,
other things being equal, one would expect that a
greater return on assets would produce high debt
coverage and have lower financial risk, producing a
negative coefficient on the explanatory variable.
However if profit was declining over the period, the
coefficient should be positive, indicating greater risk
exposure.
The average cost of debt is expected to positively
impact on financial risk.
One would also expect the land price variable to be
related to any underlying trend. In this case rising
land prices, other things being equal, should provide
greater security, thereby reducing financial risk. One
would therefore expect a negative coefficient on the
land, price variable.
All explanatory variables are
impact of recent events on
(adaptive expectations).
Data Sources
lagged to reflect the
current expectations
With the exception of land prices, all other series
were taken from various issues of the New Zealand Meat
and Wool Board I s Economic Survey of Sheep and Beef
farms. The Valuation Departments price index of
freehold fattening farm units sold on the open market
was taken as a indicator for all sheep and beef farm
types.
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Results of Analysis
Before presenting the regression estimates, an
examination of the scatter diagram (Figure 2) of
business risk verses financial risk is intuitively
instructive. Over the period 1962 to 1973 4 the points
appear to lie around a negatively sloped line, giving
support to the hypothesis. The next group of points
(1974-1978) reflect years of marked fluctuation in
returns and the introduction of production incentives
(LDELs in 1978 and LSIS in 1976) which induced higher
levels of investment. Part of this investment was
financed from external sources, hence the incease in
financial risk. The last period, 1979 to 1985, fully
reflects the impact of SMPs, with a reduction in
business risk (all points lying below 1974-1978) and a
marked increase in financial risk.
The ordinary least squares (OLS) regression results are
shown in Table 1. As was evident in the graphical
analysis, the negative coefficient on the business risk
variable (the coefficient of variation) supports the
risk balancing hypothesis, namely, other things being
equal, a fall in business risk leads to a rise in
financial risk and vice versa.
Over the period of analysis, the average interest rate
has been rising while profitability on assets has been
declining. Both increased the financial risk faced by
the sheep and beef sector, and accordingly the positive
coefficients on these two variables reflect this.
The coefficient on the land price variable is negative,
suggesting that rising land prices maintained high
levels of equity, providing borrowing capacity, thereby
-reducing the financial risk (especially insolvency).
The land price variable performed better than dummy
variables for Government programmes (LDELs, LIS, SMPs)
The benefits of these policies became capitalised
into land prices, and the impact was more than the
intercept change associated with the use of the dummy
variables.
4 The dates alongside each observation relate to the
dependent variable (financial risk).
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Business Risk Figure 1: Scatter Diagram of Business Risk verses
Financial Risk, 1962-1985.
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Table 1: Estimated Coefficients for Risk Balancing
Model
Explanatory
Variable
Constant
Business risk
Interest rate
Asset return
Land price
Coefficient
-35.512***
-6.238*
6.733***
0.962*
-0.015***
standard
Error
6.422
3.397
1. 019
0.529
0.004
R2 =
DW =
*
***
79.48%
1.503
= significant
= significant
F4,19 =
n = 24
at 10%
at 1%
18.40***
Summary and Conclusions
The risk balancing hypothesis, as tested with success
by Gabriel and Baker for the aggregate us agricultural
sector, also appea~s to have some applicability for the
New Zealand sheep and beef sector. The inverse
relationship between business and financial risk is
clearly illustrated up till 1973. For the later period
of the analysis, the taxpayer, by carrying increasing
-levels of the business risk, has created an evironment
in which the level of financial risk has markedly
increased. [Though not tested it is likely the overall
risk factor has been substantially reduced.]
The implications from the empirical analysis are clear.
Under the current Government's non-intervention policy
regime, the degree of business risk has risen, along
with the average interest rate, while land prices have
significantly declined. As a result financial risk has
risen to the level where the risk of cash insolvency
becomes critical.
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From a quantitative perspective, this concept of
financial risk is currently the one with the greater
pay-off for policy analysis. The analysis could be
couched in terms of estimating the probability that the
firm would not be able to produce a minimum (disaster)
level of funds after having serviced debtS. This then
is the problem of farm viability, and the
quantification of factors influencing that viability.
The use of Monte Carlo balance sheet modelling (Leatham
et al (1986), Perry et al (1985)), combined with an
appropriate qualitative approach (Amemiya (1981)),
such as a logit specification (Intrilligator (1978)) of
survival functions is the next stage of this research
project.
5 Let 0( = the probability, and Z = the disaster
level of funds, then the relevant concept would be:
P(cx-I~Z) ~o(
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FUNDING AND roNDUCT OF AGRICULTURAL IW) IN NEW ZEALAND
D. Veronica A. Jardine
Ruakura Agricultural Research Centre, Private Bag, Hamilton
SUMMARY
The transaction cost approach indicates that market failure which
results in underinvestment in R&D need not necessarily warrant
government provision. The approach suggests that agricultural R&D may
be efficiently funded by firms which can capture sufficient of the
benefits to make the investment worthwhile. Where R&D results in
spillovers, collectives of firms may together fund the R&D if they
can together capture sufficient of the benefits to make the formation
of a collective and the investment in R&D worthwhile. The government
may have a role in facilitating the formation of collectives, in
funding R&D which results in benefits which cannot be captured by
firms or collectives, and in conducting R&D which cannot be
efficiently bought from the private sector.
Key Words: Funding, Agriculture, R&D, Transaction Costs
INTOODUCI'ION
Recent government reductions in the public funding of research and
developnent (R&D) and the introduction of the "\lser pays" principle
to agricultural R&D in New Zealand have prompted several examinations
of the state of science and technology (Beattie, 1986; O'Donnell and
Troughton, 1986 and Ulyatt, 1986). This paper discusses the efficient
funding and conduct of agricultural R&D in New Zealand which has
historically been funded and conducted by the public sector, and has
been concerned largely with production. Private sector R&D funded by
firms and collectives such as Research Associations by levies on
producers, has been concerned primarily with processing. The recent
changes in public funding of agricultural R&D in New Zealand and
changes in government macroeconomic policies are likely to lead to
substantial changes in the traditional pattern of funding and
undertaking of agricultural R&D.
An issue central to the discussion of agricultural R&D is that of the
efficient use of available resources, which relates to the return on
investment in agricultural R&D. A return higher than the the risk
adjusted social opportunity cost of capital suggests that more
resources should be invested. Conversely, a lower return would imply
that resources should be moved out of agricultural R&D and into
other, more profitable investments. Recent research indicates that
investment in agricultural R&D in New Zealand has a large, long-term
payoff, in keeping with estimates for other countries. Eveleens and
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Scobie (1986) estimate the annual rate of return to agricultural R&D
in New Zealand to be 30 percent over 23 years. This rate of return is
generally higher than those observed in other public or private
investments and suggests that there may be underinvestment in
agricultural R&D in New Zealand.
The traditional "market failure" response to under investment has been
government action to fund and conduct agricultural R&D. A new
"transaction costs" approach suggests that underinvestment occurs
when transaction costs, which accomPanY all economic activity,
constrain or prevent exchanges of agricultural R&D. The
underinvestment which results may be relieved by government policies
to reduce transaction costs facing private investors in some
instances. The government should reduce transaction costs only if
they arise from imPediments to activities which it is sensible for
the government to reduce. If government actions are aimed at .
improving efficiency, they should be undertaken only when the
benefits outweigh the costs. Government funding of agricultural R&D
through levies or taxation will be efficient where private sector
investment by firms or collectives is constrained and where other
government actions are insufficient to bring about such investment.
"MARKET FAILURE" APPROACH TO R&D
The traditional "market failure" approach to R&D suggests that where
a competitive economy does not invest in the "optimal" amount of R&D
due to market failure, government intervention should be undertaken
to improve the allocation of resources to R&D. The market failure
justifications for public sector, taxation-based funding have
dominated the Iiterature since Arrow applied this approach to R&D
(Arrow, 1962). This viewpoint continues to be important today, and
emerges in the recent Beattie Report on Science and Technology in New
Zealand (Beattie, 1986).
"However it is apParent that market forces alone will not
lead to all the research and development required by a
country being actually performed. Among the principal ways
in which the market system can fail are
i) where the cost of research and development is excessive
in relation to the state of the industry (eg, infant
industry or an industry as yet unborn);
ii) where a firm cannot capture sufficient of the benefits
of innovation for itself;
iii) where the lead time necessary for the research and
development exceeds the normal time scale considered by a
firm when evaluating the return from an investment;
iv) where the overall risk of failure in the project is
perceived as excessive by sources of venture capi tal. "
The principal theoretical drawbacks of the market failure approach to
R&D are that it does not examine the underlying causes of market
failure (which can be seen to originate in transaction costs), nor
does it examine the efficiency of the government intervention it
advocates. It thus provides an incomplete argument for public sector
conduct and funding of agricultural R&D where there is
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underinvestment.
"TRANSACTION COSTS" APPROACH TO R&D
A more recent approach to agricultural R&D is that of transaction
costs, a relatively new development which is primarily associated
with Williamson (See, for example, Williamson, 1985 and Baumol,
1986). It has become apParent that market failure arises because of
the presence of transaction costs which occur with every exchange ot'
goods and services, and which range in importance from the
prohibitive to the trivial. These costs constrain and can even
prevent exchanges of goods and services which would otherwise occur
in frictionless markets without such costs. However, these are real
costs associated with business activity, and must be faced by firms
in the same way as costs of material, marketing, labour etc. Private
investment in agricultural R&D will occur where the gains exceed the
total costs of such investment. Where there are substantial
transaction costs constraining private sector investment in
agricultural R&D, the government may have a role in reducing these
(e.g. removal of economic distortions, the formation of collectives)
to facilitate further private investment where the benefits of doing
so exceed the costs. Where the private sector faces transaction costs
which prevent investment, and which cannot be economically reduced by
government action, the government may have a role in funding
agricultural R&D if the return is adequate. The transaction cost
approach thus challenges the automatic response of the market failure
approach that government provision is mandatory in the mere presence
of market failure. It examines the sources of market failure and
indicates where private and public sector funding of R&D may be
efficient. It concludes that the public sector may have a reduced
role in the funding and conduct of agricul tural research, but may be
more usefully engaged in formulating policies to reduce transaction
costs facing private sector investors.
FUNDING N.Z. AGRICULTURAL R&D
Funding and Conduct of R&D
The funding of R&D can be separated from the conduct of R&D.
Organizations which fund agricultural R&D may choose to carry out
their research internally. Organizations which carry out their own
R&D include private firms (e.g. in-house R&D), collectives of firms
(e.g. WRONZ), or the public sector (e.g. DSIR). Alternatively,
organizations which fund agricultural R&D may contract to buy R&D
from independent organizations which carry out R&D in either the
public or private sectors. Firms, collectives and private or public
sector organizations may thus buy and sell R&D to other firms,
collectives or private or public sector research organizations.
Factors which are important in determining whether R&D will be
internally undertaken and the type of contract involved in the sale
of R&D are the frequency of transactions, the uncertainty surrounding
the contract which is reflected in the costs of contracting to ensure
adherence to the agreement, and the degree to which the assets of the
seller are SPeCific to a particular buyer (e.g. the assets of WRONZ
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are likely to be specific to the interests of woolgrowers).
The Beneficiaries of Agricultural R&D
If the benefit conferred. or "user pays" principle is accepted as an
ethical norm, as it has become increasingly in New Zealand, equity
requires that the beneficiaries should pay for agricultural R&D. The
issues of efficiency and equity therefore coincide, both requiring
the identification of the beneficiaries of agricultural R&D. The
problems thus are ones of identifying the beneficiaries and
establishing efficient mechanisms to link them with the funding of
agricultural R&D.
The objective of agricultural R&D is to increase productivity or to
reduce costs through technological change which results in an
aggregate economic surplus or national gain. The concept of economic
surplus underlies methods to establish the direct benefits of applied
agricultural R&D. The economic surplus generated by technological
change in agriculture in New Zealand is broadly distributed among
several different economic sectors: domestic and overseas consumers,
measured by the consumers' surplus, and domestic and overseas
producers and processors, measured by the producers' surplus.
The distribution of the benefits of agricultural R&D between
producers and consumers can be shown diagrammatically in Figure 1.
The demand curve is D and the supply curve S. The initial equilibrium
is quantity Q, at price P. The initial consumers' surplus is PFC and
producers' surplus PCB. Cost reducing irmovations reduce the per unit
production costs by k from the initial equilibrium position, shifting
the supply curve to S I. Quantity increases to Q I and. retail price
falls to PI' increasing the consumer surplus by the area P1PCE. The
producers' surplus increases by area PzPIEG. The aggregate social
gain due to the cost-saving irmovation is ABCE =PzPCEG.
The distribution of the gains thus depends on the elasticity of the
demand curve relative to the supply curve of the commodity in
question. If the demand curve is perfectly elastic producers will
capture all the gain from R&D and there will be no gain to consumers.
If the agricultural output is exported, the producers' surplus
includes the gain to overseas producers and processors, while the
gain to consumers includes the gain to overseas consumers. The
proportion of the benefit flowing to all consumers can be distributed
between domestic and overseas consumers according to the proportion
of total agricultural production consumed by each. Where agricultural
production is consumed domestically and exported for overseas
consumption, then assuming no distortions in pricing in either
market, domestic prices will be determined by export prices.
81
Figure 1: Distribution of Gains from R&D
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New Zealand is a small open economy generally facing an elastic
demand curve for most agricultural exports. For most agricultural
export products there are many potential world suppliers and New
Zealand is thus a price taker, unable to influence world prices.
Scobie (1973) suggests that the aggregate elasticity of demand for
agricultural exports can be taken as infinity. The gains from R&D
into an export good with a perfectly elastic demand thus all accrue
to producers. Since the consumers' surplus is nil, neither overseas
nor domestic consumers gain. Overseas producers and processors will
gain if the domestic R&D results in a cost reduction for them. When
the export demand elasticity for New Zealand agricultural exports is
large and the supply elasticity low, producers will gain a large
proportion of the total benefits, while domestic and overseas
consumers will together gain a lesser proportion. Thus the main
beneficiaries of New Zealand agricultural research are likely to be
domestic producers and processors.
FUNDING MECHANISMS
There are several different mechanisms for matching the beneficiaries
with funding, as shown in Figure 2. It may be difficult to establish
a mechanism to obtain funding from overseas consumers and producers
wno benefit from domestic agricultura~ R&D, althol~h international
negotiation between collectives for funding may be possible.
Intellectual property rights such as copyrights, patents and plant
variety rights may force overseas consumers and producers to pay for
the use of R&D from which they benefit, although this may be more
feasible for product than process R&D.
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The ability of firms to appropriate the returns to agricultural R&D
is an important consideration determining whether research can be
efficiently funded by private sector producers or processors.
Individual private firms and collectives of firms are the primary
mechanisms for funding agricultural R&D where the benefits are
appropriable. A government levy on agricultural output matches the
beneficiaries with funding when the benefits cannot be appropriated
by firms or collectives. Domestic consumers who benefit from
agricultural R&D may be matched with funding through direct taxation
or government levies on agricultural output.
Figure 2: Matching Beneficiaries with Funding
Beneficiaries
Overseas Producers,
Processors and
Consumers
Domestic Producers
and Processors
Domestic Consumers
Funding Mechanism
Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks
Firms
Collectives - Voluntary - Industry
- Multi-Industry
- Regional
- Government Assisted
- Compulsory
Agricultural Levy
Agricultural Levy
General Taxation
Market forces provide firms with incentives to invest in R&D where
sufficient of the benefits can be captured to make the investment
worthwhile (e.g. agricultural machinery). Mechanisms for protecting
the benefits of R&D from being captured by other firms include
patents, copyrights, trade secrets and monopoly power. When these
mechanisms are ineffective the benefits of R&D may spillover and be
captured by rival firms. Such spillovers reduce the private incentive
to firms to invest in R&D because they bear the full costs of such
investment but enjoy only part of the gains, which may not exceed the
investment. In addition, a firm may recognize that the spillover will
advantage competitors, and this may further reduce the incentive.
Underinvestment in agricultural R&D by private firms may thus result.
The government may be able to reduce such underinvestment, for
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example by improving patent laws, if such measures are worthwhile.
However, measures which improve the investment climate in general
should also increase the incentive to private sector investment in
agricultural R&D.
Collectives
Spillovers between firms mean that no single finn can capture enough
of the benefits to make investment worthwhile (e.g. wool research).
Firms which enjoy spillovers in the absence of a collective may thus
be eXPected to form voluntary collectives to fund R&D ex ante and
share the benefits ex post if the benefits can be captured within the
collective and sharing is technologically feasible (Katz, 1986).
Collectives which fund agricultural R&D already exist in some
industries, often as an adjunct to other activities, such as
marketing. Some producer organizations directly conduct their own
research, (e.g. N.Z. Meat and Wool Boards' Economic Service). The
wool, meat and dairy industries fund their own agricultural R&D
through Research Associations which receive around half their funding
from taxation. In other industries producers also belong to
levy-funded collectives which fund a certain amount of R&D, generally
purchased from the public sector tmder research contracts. Overall
only a small percentage of the total levy is spent on research, as
shown in Table 1. The pattern of levy spending varies among
industries, but the remainder of the levy income is generally spent
on items such as promotion, advertising, marketing, quality
assurance, transport, administration, crop insurance, and providing
services and information.
The low eXPenditure on R&D and relatively high eXPenditure of the
levy on other items suggests that industry collectives are willing to
co-operate in order to fund and market their products, but that R&D
may have a low investment priority. other industries collecting
levies, on which levy income and. spending ,data is unavailable, are
shown in Table 2. The existence of industry groupings suggests that
industry members might be prepared to collectively fund R&D, in the
absence of public sector funding, if they are prePared to
collectively fund other, marketing-related activities.
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Table 1: Industry Levies and Research Funding in New Zealand
Agriculture
Organization Total
Levy
Income
$000
Research
Funding
(% Totall
Recipients
of Research
Funding
HORTICULTURAL INDUSTRIES
NZ Kiwifruit Authority 7,007 2.2 DSIR,MAF,others
NZ Apple & Pear Marketing
Board - a Various
NZ Nurseryman's Assoc. NZ Nursery
Research Centre
NZ Vegetable and Produce
Growers Federation 420 11.9b Various
Tobacco Board 31 54.0 DSIR
Hop Marketing Committee 17 100.0 DSIR (Riwaka)
NZ Fruitgrowers Federation 207 12.0 DSIR,NZAEI and
others
MEAT, WOOL & DAIRY INDUSTRIES
NZ Meat Producers' Board 15,467 7.4 Not Specified
NZ Wool Board 68,801 2.5 WRONZ
NZ Dairy Board 2,300 DRI
NZ Milk Board 2,762 0.5 Not Specified
NZ Pork Industry Board 1,777 2.1 Massey and
others
NZ Paultry Board 7,888 1.2 Mainly Poultry
Research Centre
ARABLE INDUSTRIES
NZ Wheat Board 1,227 b 100.0 CRD and WRI
NZ Potato Board 71 1.4 Not Specified
Source: Fordyce, 1986
a. Confidential
b. Estimated
A collective may act autonomously in arranging the conduct of the
agricultural R&D it ftmds. It may buy R&D from private or public
sector organizations (e.g. DSIR), or it may organise its own internal
R&D (e.g. MIRINZ).
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Table 2: other Industries Collecting Levies
COMPULSORY LEVIES
N. Z. Berryfruit Growers' Federation
VOLUNTARY LEVIES
Dominion Federation of Chinese Commercial Growers
Avocado Promotion Council
N.Z. Babaco Growers Inc.
Blueberry Growers Association
Canterbury Flowers Export Council
Fruit Wine Makers Of N.Z.
N.Z. Garlic Growers Export Committee
N. Z. Greenhouse Grape Council
Horned. Melon Association
Commercial Mushroom Growers Association
Nashi Growers Association
Export Orchid Growers Association
N. Z. Persimmon Promotion Association
National Tamarillo Association
N. Z. Fresh Tomato Industry F\md
N. Z. Tree/ Crops Association
National Beekeepers' Association of N.Z.
Source: Fordyce, 1986
A collective offers the advantage of appropriability of the benefits
of agricultural R&D which increases with size; it allows members some
influence over research programmes and priorities; and improves the
accountability of sellers of R&D compared. with publicly funded. and
conducted R&D. Collectives also offer the benefits of risk pooling
and the collective funding of large scale or long-term R&D. The cost
sharing in collectives raises the incentive to invest in R&D.
Collectives are likely to be most effective in increasing the
incentive to invest in R&D where firms are not competitors in the
product market (Katz,1986). However, the formation and maintenance of
collectives incur costs which increase with the size of the
collective and the heterogeneity of the interests of its members.
These costs include the costs of identifying the beneficiaries or
potential members, the costs of organizing and collecting levies and
the costs of managing the purchase or conduct of R&D. There are also
"agency costs" within collectives, where members attempt to ensure
that their representatives act in their interests, and the costs
which arise from the divergent interests, research requirements and
priorities of members. The gains of collective action for the
beneficiaries of agricultural R&D must thus be weighed against the
costs in determining whether collectives will be efficient mechanisms
for funding agricultural R&D.
The collectives may be of several distinct kinds, each requiring
different types of government action.
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Voluntary Collectives:
Voluntary collectives or associations such as those that already
exist (shown in Table 1) and which fund agricultural R&D may be
expected to continue, and new collectives may be expected to form in
response to the adoption of the "user pays" philosophy by government.
As government funding of R&D decreases, funding through vohmtary
collectives may increase. Firms which previously enjoyed the benefits
of publicly funded agricultural R&D may be individually too small to
fund R&D and capture the benefits, but may voluntarily act together
to fund R&D where they can collectively capture the benefits. The
government has no role in the formation or levying of voluntary
collectives beyond its usual role in the maintenance of the patent
system.
Voluntary collectives allow the possibility of free-riding where
benefits spillover to non-members and reduce the gain to members.
With voluntary membership the revenue collected and consequent
investment in R&D is reduced compared with compulsory membership,
reducing the aggregate size of the potential gain. However, voluntary
collectives will be effective in funding agricultural R&D as long as
the gains captured by the members exceed the costs of collective
action and investment. Voluntary collectives usually form along
industry lines. They may also form along other lines, (e.g.
sub-industry, multi-industry or regional) as long as members can
internalize the benefits and exclude non-members.
Multi-industry or Regional Voluntary Collectives:
Where there are benefits from agricultural R&D which cannot be
captured by single industry collectives due to inter-industry
spillovers, then multi-industry or regional collectives may be able
to internalize the benefits. Areas where such spillovers occur
include inter-industry research where there are spillovers between
similar industries (e.g. grasslands research for all pastoral
industries, shelter research for all horticultural industries) and
research into regional problems (e.g. soil erosion research for all
hill country industries). However, the monitoring and co-operation
costs associated with large, heterogeneous collectives may exceed the
benefits of collective action and investment in R&D. The funding of
agricultural R&D which results in widespread benefits between
industries and within regions in the agricultural sector may be more
efficiently carried out by government levies.
Government-Assisted Voluntary Collectives:
In some industries voluntary collectives which fund R&D may be
feasible, but their formation may be hampered by high transaction
costs. In the present state of change in the organization of
agricultural R&D in New Zealand, these costs may be large. They may
be related to the patent system, the fact that industry members may
not perceive themselves as beneficiaries of agricultural R&D, the
fact that R&D is not considered an investment or that its payoff is
seen as long term. Beneficiaries may be reluctant to join an
collective if the R&D from which they benefit has historically been
publicly funded or if they do not consider that they have a need to
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innovate or the resources to fund R&D.
Where the transaction costs of forming voluntary industry collectives
are high the government may facilitate their formation by reducing
the transaction costs facing the private sector if the benefits of
increased private R&D investment through the collective outweigh the
costs of such action. It may be necessary to identify sPecific
transaction costs constraining the formation of collectives before
appropriate government action can be taken.
Compulsory Industry Levy-Funded Collectives:
Voluntary collectives will be effective in funding R&D insofa~ as the
benefits of the R&D so funded can be captured within the group.
Free-riding reduces the gain to members, reducing the incentive to
form a collective and invest in R&D. There may be insufficient
incentive for firms to form voluntary industry collectives and invest
in R&D despite government actions to reduce transaction costs if
free-riding persists.
Government intervention to establish compulsory membership of a
collective to include all the beneficiaries may be necessary to
ensure private funding of R&D through levies. Compulsory membership
matches the beneficiaries with funding, reduces free-riding,
increases the incentive to invest, increases aggregate revenue,
increases aggregate benefits, offers the advantages of collectives
and allows the industry to fund and autonomously administer its own
R&D.
Government Levy on the Agricultural Sector
Agricultural R&D which generates spillover benefits which are limited
to the agricultural sector but which carmot be captured by
collectives or firms may require government intervention to induce
some investment in R&D by the beneficiaries.
Direct levies may less costly than the facilitation of large
multi-industry or regional collectives and may be more efficient than
general taxation at matching the beneficiaries with funding.
Agricultural R&D which results in widespread benefits to regions or
across industries which are not captured within costly collectives
can be funded by levies, since the benefits are limited to clearly
identifiable groups. Agricultural R&D which benefits future
industries and where the benefits thus carmot be captured by existing
industries (e.g. new plant varieties); and which benefits the
agricultural sector in general (e.g. all agricultural industries
benefit from soil and water research) can be funded by a levy on the
agricultural sector as a whole in addition to industry levies.
Consumers in NeH Zealand do not in general gain from agricultural
R&D. However, if domestic consumers do benefit from agricultural R&D
in certain industries, then an alternative to general taxation is the
collection of levies on agricultural output which would ensure that
consumers contribute funding to agricultural R&D to the extent that
they benefi t from it. The effect of an levy or indirect tax is shown
in Figure 3.
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At the pre-tax price of P, consumers demand Q units of agricultural
output. The imposition of an indirect tax (PI - P2) on domestically
consumed agricultural output shifts the supply curve upwards to 81.
Consumers now pay PI for agricultural output, while producers receive
P2. The total amount of indirect tax is shown by the area PIEFGPz.
The tax burden borne by consumers is the area PIEFP, while the burden
borne by producers is PFGP2. The analysis is similar to that of the
distribution of the benefits of agricultural R&D, indicating that the
benefits will be distributed in an identical way to costs paid
through indirect taxation.
Figure 3: Effects of an Indirect Tax on Producers and Consumers
Prices
a
Q Quantities
The funding of agricultural R&D by levies involves problems related
to the question of accountability, the basis on which levies should
be set, the question of who should pay them and the asymmetry of the
costs and benefits. Funding by general taxation also involves
problems of accountability.
(i) Accountability
The disadvantage of any public funding of agricultural R&D through
taxation or levies is the lack of direct accountability of the public
sector to the taxpayers or payers of levies. The funders may be
unable to influence the pace and direction of R&D; they may have no
say in the level of overall funding or the levy rate; and they may be
unable to monitor the performance of public agencies w~ich administer
R&D, since these agencies have no direct accountability to the
funders, and there is no monitoring mechanism. The formation of
boards comprised of representatives of the funders to control the
expenditure of revenue, determine the rate and direction of funding
and monitor the performance of the sellers in accordance with the
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customer-contractor principle may be an imperfect solution. The
imPerfections arise if the funders are unable to monitor the
performance of their representatives, and reward or discipline
performance by a mechanism such as election. The large number of
funders may also make election of representatives costly.
(ii) Levy Basis
The choice of a basis on which levies should be made should take
account of the relevant advantages and disadvantages of each: the
costs and benefits of each method of revenue collection; their
efficiency in matching the beneficiaries with the funding of R&D; and
their effects on relative prices which affect the aggregate level of
agricultural output, the choice of inputs and outputs in production
and the choice of consumption. Levies may be made on several possible
bases. These include levies on the volume of agricultural production,
where output is levied per unit; the value of agricultural
production; and productive land as the residual resource to which all
agricultural economic returns accrue. Most New Zealand agricultural
levies on commodities, collected by the industry collectives shown in
Table 1, are volume-based although some, including wool, are
value-based (Fordyce, 1986).
When there are widespread spillover benefits to the agricultural
sector as a whole which cannot be captured by firms or collectives, a
uniform rural research levy on gross income from primary production
of all agricultural taxpayers would match the beneficiaries with
funding. A rural research levy of this kind has been suggested for
Australia (Working Group Report to the Minister for Primary Industry,
1982, p.120). It would be equitable since every primary producer
taxpayer would contribute. Such a rural levy would then be additional
to the industry levies paid to vohmtary industry collectives and
autonomously administered by them.
(iii) Payers of Levies
(a) Where an industry comprises many commodities it may be difficult
to SPecify which commodity will incur a levy, particularly on
processed goods.
(b) New entrants to an industry may benefit from the R&D funded by
existing and previous members.
(c) There may be some industries where a lack of organizational and
marketing ar'rangements make the collection of levies difficult. Where
some form of collective action already exists (e.g. marketing
associations), the formation of industry collectives and the
collection of levies may be easier.
(iv) Asymmetry of Costs and Benefits
The distribution of the costs and benefits of agricultural R&D is not
symmetrical in a multistage production process if non-levied inputs
can be substituted. for levied inputs. If the levy is made at the
production stage and processors substitute a non-levied for a levied
input, (e.g. using improved machinery to process a given quantity of
sheepmeat more efficiently) then they will escape some of the
taxation burden but enjoy a disproportionate share of the benefits,
and producers will incur a disproportionate share of the costs. In
this case, the benefits will not be distributed in the same way as
costs, so that each stage will be unwilling to fund R&D carried out
in another stage of a multistage sector.
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General Taxation
Where the beneficiaries of agricultural R&D are consumers then the
community as a whole forms the "collective". However, the number,
dispersion, diverse interests and poor organization of consumers
makes the formation of a single consumer collective to fund
agricultural R&D unlikely, since the costs of organizing and
maintaining the collective could be expected to outweigh the
benefits. This would also hold even if consumer collectives were to
be organized along commodity lines. There are several additional
problems in using a consumer collective to fund agricultural R&D
which impose transaction costs on the formation of collectives:
(a) The benefits to consumers are less visible, more diffuse and
.harder to measure than the benefits to producers. It is difficult to
translate the idea of economic surplus into a political argument that
generates support for agricultural R&D as consumers seldom relate
benefits such as lower prices or improved qualities to agricultural
research and technological change, and their individual gain may in
any case be small.
(b) New Zealand has historically publicly funded and conducted
agricultural research, including R&D on export commodities, financed
by general taxation. The current contributions by urban taxpayers
amount to 80 percent of domestic agricultural R&D. However, the
supply and demand elasticities of most agricultural export
commodities with domestic prices set in world markets suggest that
domestic consumers in general are not the main beneficiaries of
agricultural R&D and that taxation-based funding is an implicit
subsidy by the predominantly urban consumers to producers in the
rural sector. Domestic consumers may thus not favour further
taxation-based public funding of agricultural R&D.
AIthough it may be reasonable to assume that most consumers will also
be taxpayers, it is probably not true. that for all commodities all
taxpayers are consumers. Matching consumers who benefi t from
agricultural R&D with funding through taxation may thus be imperfect.
Even so, government collection of taxation or levy revenue may be
less costly than direct funding through a consumer collective.
Taxation or levies may be efficient when transaction costs constrain
consumer investment in agricultural R&D and when the benefits of such
government action exceed the costs.
Agricultural R&D may be efficiently and equitably funded by general
taxation where the benefits of agricultural R&D cannot be
appropriated by firms or collectives (e.g. basic research) and where
the benefits are so widely diffused throughout the community that no
individual or group can be identified as benefiting from the research
(e •g. food safety, environmental quality) .
THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT IN NEW ZEALAND AGRICULTURAL R&D
The government has distinct roles in funding agricultural R&D, in
carrying out agricultural R&D and in government action to facilitate
private sector investment in agricultural R&D. Although some of these
have been mentioned above, they are considered together in this
section for clarity.
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Government Actions
Transaction costs arise primarily from the uncertainty surrounding
the sale of goods and services, and are sometimes so great that the
sale is constrained or even prevented. Government action to reduce or
remove transaction costs to facilitate exchange is costly, and
constitutes a private sector subsidy. There is little more reason for
the government to bear these costs than there is for it to subsidise
production generally. However, government actions which are aimed at
other goals may also have the effect of reducing the transaction
costs of private sector investment in R&D (e.g. the removal of
economic distortions). The costs of some government actions, such as
the formation of compulsory collectives, may be recoverable through
levies. If government action is aimed at improving efficiency (i.e.
reducing costs), it should be undertaken only if the return is
worthwhile in terms of increased investment in agricultural R&D.
Government action may take several forms, each related to the
amelioration of the effects of transaction costs on private sector
investment:
(i) The government may be able to reduce the transaction costs of
investment in agricultural R&D facing private firms. Such measures
may involve the removal of economic distortions and improvements to
the patent system. Measures which improve the investment climate in
general are likely to increase investment in R&D.
( ii) The government may be able to facilitate the formation of
voluntary collectives where transaction costs limit collective
action. Government actions could include improvements to the patent
system. It may also be necessary to identify SPecific transaction
costs constraining collective formation before appropriate action can
be taken.
(iii) The government may form compulsory collectives where the
persistence of free-riding prevents the formation of voluntary
collectives despite government action to reduce transaction costs.
Once the collecti ves are formed no further government action is
required in collecting levies or administering the purchase of R&D.
Government actions to institute compulsory collectives include:
(a) identifying the beneficiaries,
(b) legally setting up a collective and defining the membership, and
(c) setting levies.
(iv) The government may form boards which include representatives of
taxpayers and payers of levies to improve the accountability of
government agencies and increase the role of the market in
determining the rate and direction of agricultural research.
Government Funding
The government may fund agricultural R&D through levies on the
agricultural sector and general taxation. Both impose costs on the
public sector. .
(i) The government may impose a levy on agricultural output where
agricultural R&D results in benefits which are limited to the
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agricultural sector, but which are not captured by firms or
collectives. Research which benefits consumers and research into new
agricultural industries could also be funded in this way.
(ii) The government may fund agricultural R&D through general
taxation where the benefits are not limited to the agricultural
sector and cannot be appropriated private sector firms or
collectives; where the benefits are so diffused among the members of
society that the costs of identifying the users and exacting paJ~ent
outweigh the benefits; and where consumers benefit from agricultural
research.
Government Conduct
In New Zealand the public sector has traditionally both funded and
carried out agricultural R&D. However, the implementation of recent
policy changes suggests that the role of the government in conducting
R&D will change.
(i) The government may conduct routine agricultural R&D for sale to
private sector firms and collectives (e.g. laboratory services).
However, the reduction in transaction costs facing the private sector
suggests that private sector sellers of R&D may enter the market, and
increased competition may reduce public sector conduct and sale of
this type of agricultural R&D.
(ii) The government may conduct agricultural R&D for sale to private
sector firms or collectives where the assets of the government ag~ncy
are specific to the buyer (e.g. long term development contracts with
particular industries). However, the formation of collectives and the
presence of contracting costs suggest that the specific assets may be
taken over by the firm or collective where the benefits exceed the
costs.
(iii) The government may buy agricultural R&D, in cases where public
funding is justified, from private sector sellers. However, the
transaction costs associated with the purchase of certain kinds of
agricultural R&D from the private sector under contract may make
public sector conduct a more efficient alternative since the
traditions of public service may be perceived as an implicit
guarantee of performance. This may be particularly true of R&D where
contracting costs are high, where there is a threat of opportunism,
where monitoring the sellers is difficult, and where it is difficult
to specify research requirements (e.g. basic research). However, the
costs associated with bureaucracy in government and the public
conduct of R&D may be high and must be weighed against the costs of
private sector purchase of R&D.
CONCLUSION
The transaction cost approach compares the relative efficiency of
alternative institutions in organizing economic activity, including
R&D. Although all market institutions are imperfect due to the
presence of transactions costs surrounding all exchanges, this
"market failure" does not necessarily imply that government provision
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is mandatory where the market is inefficient in supplying R&D. There
are a nl.D11ber of ways, including provision, in which the government
can act to influence the level of R&D investment in the economy. The
choice of government actions and funding and conduct policies to
redress the "failure" of markets in agricultural R&D should include a
realistic appraisal of the associated costs and benefits of each, as
governments as well as markets are inherently imperfect and "fail"
due to the presence of transaction costs, and they may in fact have
fewer incentives to be efficient than markets.
The transaction costs approach to agricultural R&D indicates the
relative efficiency of various private and public sector funding
mechanisms of agricultural R&D. The available evidence suggests that
domestic producers and processors, rather than domestic consumers,
are the main beneficiaries of agricultural R&D in New Zealand.
Domestic producers and processors can be expected to fund
agricultural R&D through private firms or collectives of private
firms, where they can appropriate sufficient of the benefits to make
the collective action and investment in R&D worthwhile. Where private
investment is constrained the government may have a role in reducing
transaction costs. Government actions include improvements to the
investment climate in general and improvements to the patent system.
The identification of specific transaction cost constraints may be
necessary before appropriate action can abe taken. If free-riding
persists despite transaction cost reductions government formation of
complusory collectives enables identifiable groups of beneficiaries
to fund R&D. A government levy on the agricultural sector where R&D
results in widespread benefits which limited to the agricultural
sector but not captured by firms or collectives matches all
beneficiaries with funding. An agricultural levy could also fund R&D
into new crops and R&D which benefits consumers. General taxation may
fund agricultural R&D which benefits the nation as a whole. The
accountabil i ty of public sector funders to taxpayers and payers of
levies may be improved by the fonnation of a board or boards to
oversee levy expenditure and the direction and pace of agricultural
R&D.
Clearly, the implications of this approach suggest that in the long
run the public sector will playa reduced role in agricultural R&D,
funding those areas where the R&D is inappropriable or where the
costs of forming collectives exceed the benefits. The
asset-specificity of the public sector may permit it to continue to
conduct R&D funded by private sector firms and collectives in the
short run. However, in the long run the increase in private sector
sellers of R&D will reduce the asset-specificity advantage enjoyed by
the public sector, and its role as a seller of agricultural R&D may
decrease. The costs involved with the sale of R&D where
asset-specificity is high may lead to internal organization by
private sector buyers. Where agricultural R&D is publicly funded, it
may be purchased from private or public sector sellers. The costs
associated with bureaucracy and public sector conduct of R&D must be
weighed against the contracting costs of purchase from the private
sector in determining the efficient organization of the conduct of
publicly funded agricultural R&D.
In the immediate future, however, where industry collectives are not
operational, users of R&D cannot be easily identified and the farming
sector has a reduced investment capability, the government may be
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justified in maintaining a level of funding which will not reduce the
future payoff to R&D while implementing policies to reduce the
transaction costs of undertaking R&D for the private sector,
facilitating the formation of voluntary and compulsory collectives,
instituting levies on the agricultural sector and establishing boards
to act in the interests of taxpayers and payers of levies. In other
words while there are sound theoretical reasons to expect a smaller
level of public funding for agricultural R&D than has traditionally
been the case, the timing and sequencing of the policy changes need
to be examined. Substantial short run reductions in the overall level
of public and private investment in agricultural R&D are likely to
imply a reduced rate of growth in agricultural productivi ty in the
future.
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SUSTAINABLE AGRICULTURE IN THEORY AND IN PRACTICE
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SUMMARY
Future management of the world's resources depends upon
reconciling the needs of socio-economic development with
the conservation of the world's environment. A strategic
framework that permits understanding and managing the
long-term, potentially large-scale interactions between
these requirements, based upon the sustainable develop-
ment of the natural resources of the biosphere, is
needed. Can modern agriculture with its sophisticated
scientific support base assure sufficient food and fibre
production in the future? Are available agricultural
resources capable of supporting ever increasing popula-
tions? How do different technological paths influence the
natural and social environments of rural people? How is
it possible to distinguish between the sustainable and
the unstainable? Questions like these form the core of
the notion of sustainability. Thus far, however, the
concept remains vague and subject
tu all sorts of different meanings. This paper explores
the concept's operational significance as a guide to
public policy.
Key Words: Sustainability, Agriculture, Agroecosystem,
Theory, Practice, Future Generations.
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INTRODUCTION
There is an emerging interest throughout the world in the
adequacy of the natural resource base to sustain economic
development. The unprecedented increase in living stan-
dards in the last century and a half have occurred
because of the increased depletion of nonrenewable
resources (e.g. fossil fuels) and the unsustained rates
of renewable resource use (e.g. ocean fisheries, native
forests). Unfortunately, since the long term
consequences are very difficult to comprehend, the policy
choices and consequences will always be matters of great
s pee u 1a t i on . Eve n t ua 11 y, tho ugh , soc io - e c anomie s y s t ems
will be forced to be more dependent on flow rather than
stock resources, more careful not to degrade the natural
en vir a nmen t i r rever sib 1 y , and mar e ear nest tal ear n to
manage the biosystem more productively.
In agriculture, the avoidance of harmful side-effects of
high output technologies can require limiting the use of
erodible soils, the use of proper drainage in irrigation
areas, the improved management of slowly degrading
resources like water and soil, the avoidance of chemical
buildups in soil and water and food,and the reliance on
monocultures which pose future risks for preservation of
genetic diversity. In each of these cases there are
significant, near-term costs. Especially for developing
countries, the tradeoffs between immediate known benefits
and the less well understood long term sustainability of
the system can be a cruel choice. Indeed, the need for
rational, objective decisions ahout the mangement, future
development and possible depletion of natural resource
systems in agriculture is very great.
The term sustainability is unequivoclllbly an assertion
about the future. Can certain agricultural practices
better conserve, maintain and enhance productivity and
quality of human life in p~rpetuity? Sustainability
might also be thought of as a process through which
resource management systems evolve to permit regeneration
(Altieri, 1986) or the coevolution of the man:environment
system (Norgaard, 1984). In a dynamic conception of the
process of change, sustainability also stands for an
increasingly sophisticated approach to the definition of
problems, the analysis of resources and environmental
issues, and the management of complex farming systems.
It implies a long term commitment to farmers, educators,
researchers and to future generations. In fact sustaina-
bility can mean just about anything to anybody. This is
the problem addressed in this paper.
The paper is more an ambivalent review of the literature
than a critical analysis of the subject. It is perhaps
most accurately described as an exploritory effort by the
author to examine the workability of the concept in the
broader field of natural resource lTlanagement, particu-
larly ill the case of renewable rc'source systems. This
spirit of ambivalence is important to stress since th('
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author neither fully understands all the issues nor is
willing to adopt a particular stance (knowlingly) at this
juncture. It may be interesting to note in passing that
by far the majority of print devoted to the notion of
sustainability concerns agriculture.
The balance of the paper is organised as follows. The
next section reports a brief overview of three contrast-
ing philosophical approaches which employ sustainability
in significantly different ways. Each appears to draw
upon a different epistemological basis for theoretical
support and guidance in problem definition and problem
solving. \~hat emerges is a transdisciplinary view of
sustainability that is mutually supporting, but in which
no particular disciplinary perspective is dominating.
The next section briefly outlines the concept of agroeco-
system which seems at the present time to best reflect
this multidisciplinary approach in agricultural research.
The concluding section presents some ideas on New Zealand
research needs where the concept of sustainability
appears potentially useful.
THE MEANINGS OF SUSTAINABILITY
This sec t i on d raws h e a v i 1 y on a colI e c t i on of r e c en t
conference papers edited by William Lockerety (1983),
Gordon Douglass (1984), Thomas Edens, et a1., (1985) and
the University of California Committee (986). In partic-
ular it employs a philosophical taxonomy suggested by
Douglass which has considerable merit as an integrating
framework. While many views expressed about sustainabil-
ity are unique in their own right (extremism is no vice
on this issue!), they boil down, more or less, to belong-
ing to one of three intellectual camps. They are the: 1)
economic food sufficiency, "dynamic market equili-
brium" -- school; 2) ecologic -- stewardship, "ecologi-
cally-driven, evolutionary systems" --school; and 3)
sociologic community development (" ••• a sustainable
agriculture does not deplete soils or people ••• ")
school. Each of these schools or intel~ctual traditions
contain epistemologies that are in some cases at consid-
erable odds with each other. Accordingly, the full
meaning of sustainability, in its theoretical and opera-
tional sense, can only be attempted within this uneasy
(intellectually tense) environment of competing world
views. Indeed, this appears to be the concept's most
fundamental nature.
The Economics
It should come as no surprise that the basic strengths of
neo-classical economic thought are cited by its critics
as its fundamental weaknesses. The shortcomings of
applied welfare theory to agricultural and natural
resource policy analysis are well known to this audience
nne! need not be restated here. One matter of major
importance, however, should be emphasised: the profound
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inability of economic theory to deal effectively with the
futurity problem (Page, 1977; Norgaard, 1986a; Just et
.§.l.,1978). In fact, the policy sciences in general
would appear ill-informed about sustainability issues
except in the most prosaic sense (Norgaard, 1986b).
Sustainability equates to "food sufficiency" which
focuses on aggregate supply and demand, nearly always in
the short to intermediate (20 to 30 year) term. \.Jorld-
wide conditions guide agriculture. The demands for
economic growth (via population growth) induces supply
increases via international market forces. Increased
system throughput increases demands on resources and
productivity-enhancing technology. "If introduction of
new techniques leads to greater erosion, the cost of
low fertility can be justified [internationalised by the
production system] as long as technology advances yield
more than commensurate [to compensate]. Agriculture, in
this view, is primarily an instrument for feeding the
world, and preservation of the resource base is decidedly
of second:ny importAnce" (Douglass, 1984, p.1-2).
The accepted views 'wi thin this school (e. g. Farrell,
1984, and Ruttan, 1984; and Wittwer, 1983) lead one to
hypothesize a future of more of the same: fewer and
larger farms, more mechanisation, greater use of
agrochemicals, greater farm and reigonal specialisation,
greater environmental impacts. Virtually no real impor-
tance is attached to the question of the sustainability
of rural agricultural communities. It would be wrong to
think of agriculture as anything more than a business.
That prominent script above the Hilgard Building on the
D.C. Berkeley campus that says "To Rescue for Human
Society the Native Values of Rural Life" belongs to a
bygone era.
The Ecology
This school, which represents the intellectual antece-
dents of a rather diverse amalgam of physists, biolo-
gists, systems theorists, naturalists and the like,
equates sustainability with stewardship (Figure 1.). The
world view is decidedly ecological: an agricultural
system which needlessly depletes, pollutes, and disrupts
the ecological balance of nature is clearly unsustain-
able~ It is a very long run perspective on how natural
systems operate, and evolve. A biological rather than
industrial basis for agricultural productivity is neces-
sary for a sustainable agriculture: the latter will
inevitably fail mankind.
~10st writers in this camp " ••• see in natural ecosystems a
generic model for designing stable, self maintaining
ecological systems tailored to suit locel1 variations in
knowledge, climate, soils and biological diversity"
(Douglass, 1984, p.146). Some (Altier], 1984; ConV;(J)',
1987) specify requirements for sustainable agroecosys-
terns; others interpret sustainahle strategies from the
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study of traditional agriculture (Boserup, 1965; Cohen,
1977). An important argument for learning more about
present agroecological systems is that the pace of modern
development -- stimulated by the Green Revolution and the
"more-market" philosophy could destroy this poten-
tially valuable knowledge base (and gene pool). Science
is not seen as a reliable way to avoid the risk of this
potentially irreversible loss.
The Socioloey
This school views sustainability as inherently human. It
is synomous with the concept of human community. As with
the sustainability-stewardship school, they readily
recognise the need for a clean, healthy environment and
sustainable uses of biological resources. However, their
central focus is on the values to be derived from the
natural environment that promote rural culture and well-
being, of which stewardship, selfsllfficiency and commu"'""
nity vitality are paramount. Thp. theological underpin-
nings of this idea of sustainable communities is
reflected by the argument that human beings should not be
thought of as fact.ors of production whose mobility is
important to the health of the economic system. They are
the ends not the means.
The agriculture of Sri Lanka and the National Heritage
movement provide a penetrating insight into what this
perspective means to developing countries, and particu-
larly to minority cultures with a longstanding agrarian
tradition. "Natural Heritage is a sophisticated ideology
based upon the traditions of the past, an interpretation
of the present, and projections for the future. The
assumption which infuses the ideology is that there is
much of merit in Sri Lanka's traditions and, before they
are destroyed by the encroachment of \~estern oriented,
materialistic philosophy and lifestyle, it is vital to
the national interest to explore and save, if at a11
possible, what is valuable." (Douglass, 1984, p.245).
Rural communities have co-evolved with their environment
over long periods of time and much can be lost if this is
not recognised and passed on to future generntions.
!£ Integrated Approach?
The agroecosystem model may represent the development of
an integrated approach to sustainability in the making.
It is compatible with materials balance concepts widely
used in interdisciplinary research --especially by natu-
ral resource economists and it parallels in many
respects the conceptual structure of constrained economic
optimisation theory. The integrating discipline may in
fact be systems theory (Boulding, 1979).
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THE AGROCOSYSTEM CONCEPT
I
Agroecosystems are ecological systems manipulated by man
to produce specific goods and services. Because the end
products have social value, agroecosystems are cybernetic
systems which can be optimised according to stated objec-
tives. In contrast, the ecosystems they replace are
often more structurally and dynamically complex and are
frequently difficult to characterise in practice. While
the concept of ecosystem is well established, the bound-
aries can be obscure (Tansley, 1935). Conway (1987)
argues that agroecosystems can be characterised by a
limited set of dynamic properties, and this in turn
allows their essential behaviour to be described and
their performance evaluated according to a standard set
of objectives or normative criteria. This view of
agroecosystem seems generally consistent with the conven-
tional framework of economic analysis.
Cross-Disciplinary Thinking
The transformation of ecosystem to agroecosystem reduces
the great diversity and complexity of the original natu-
ral system to a restricted set of plants and animals.
This is illustrated in Conway's example of the ricefield,
Figure 2. (Conway, 1987). The bio-physical boundary of
the system becomes less permeable with the creation of
irrigation networks. The basic ecological processes of
competition, predation, etc remain but are now regulated
by agricultural processes such as cultivation, fertilisa-
tion, harvesting and marketing. The system boundary
takes on a socio-economic charcter because human cooper-
ation (and competition) define the system goals. Hence it
is this new complex of agro, socia, eco and economic
system dimensions that is embodied in the meaning of
"agroecosystem". Defined in this manner we can envisage
a hierarchy of systems and subsystems which may be rele-
vant for different purposes of analysis. For example, at
the bottom of the hierarchy .would be the individual plant
or animal and its micro-environment. The next level
might be the crop or herd agroecosystem, continuing on
through livestock system, farming system, household,
community, catchment, region, nation, economic community,
etc. A world agroecosystem would consist of national
agroecosystems linked by international trade.
Simon (1962) argues that the study of hierarchical sys-
tems is confounded by the problem of composition, and
this has important implications for agricultural policy.
Higher systems are not always understood through the
study of 10w0r systems, consequently the behaviour of the
agro-ecosystem at each level must be understood in its
own right as ,,,ell as its relation to lower and higher
levels. If systems theory is correct, then planning and
policy analysis based 'largely' on the perspectives of
macro-level economic policy, genetic engineering or
farming systems research must be :incorrectly focused,
j.e. potentially in error. Systems theorists argue that
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this sense of "totality" in understanding can only be
achieved with a common approach to analysis, and this
implies that a well defined set of system properties
exists to relate the levels of the hierarchy to each
other.
Ecologists use terms like productivity, stability and
resilience to describe the basic properties of plant and
animal communities (Holling, 1978). As mentioned earlier
the 'goal' of an agroecosystem can be defined in terms
consistent with welfare economics. The goal measure,
"social value", is a function of the goods and services
produced by the agroecosystem, their utility in satisfy-
ing human needs, and their allocation among the human
population (Conway, 1987). Further, social value has
several readily measureable components: the present
production (and its economic efficiency), its likely
level of provision over a future time horizon, and its
distributional (equity) implications. Since any agroec-
oysystem at any level in the hierarchy can have soci.al
value, it follows that one form of an agroecosystem could
be preferred to the others because its social value is
greatest.
Operational Considerations
In practice the agroecosystem model suffers from the same
abstract conceptual basis as welfare economics: the
concepts involved in defining social value are of limited
practical use. Consequently, any assessment of an agro-
system's performance must be focused on the principal
system properties that determine goal achie.vement, not
the abstract goal measure itself. Four such properties,
common to all agroecosystems, have been suggested: (1)
productivity, (2) stability, (3) sustainability, and (4)
equity (Altieri and Anderson, 1986). The first three are
defined in terms of the socially-valued output and may be
measured in both physical and socia-economic units. The
notion of equity (distributive justice) as a property of
an agroecosystem has no natural counterpart in ecological
systems.
Productivity is the measure of output per unit of input,
and can be expressed in all the conventional ways
dollars, calories, kilograms. The input/output accounting
framework may also be Ilsed to measure related performance
variables, for example employment creation, the provision
of recreational and environmental amenities, among oth-
ers. The combinntions of input and output (productivity
ratios) are the efficiency measurers used to evaluate
alternative or competing agroecosystcms (Carter and Lohr,
1986). Analyses may be undertaken at the same or differ-
ent levels in the hierarchy and between different types
of agroecosystems (e.g., lowland vs hill vs high country
pastoral systems).
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Stability is defined as the constancy of productivity
over time. Change is induced by the surrounding environ-
ment, including such causes as physical, biological,
social and ec.onomic forces which are exogenous to the
agroecosystem under study. The measure of stability is
the appropriate statistical measure of the variation
observed in the productivity time series. Hence, stabil-
ity refers to variation about the trend where producti-
vity may be rising, falling or constant. It is implied,
if not always stated, that the disturbing forces are
small and ultimately predictable within reasonable mar-
gins of error.
Sustainability refers to the ability of an agroecosystem
to maintain or regain productivity after a major distur-
bance. The disturbance may result from a catastrophic,
unforeseen event or "shock", but most generally will be
an intensive "stress" caused by an accumulation of small,
predictable disturbances over time. Shocks are charcte-
rised as unpredictable -- a new pest, a rare event such
as drought, or a market collapse -- whereas the cumula-
tive effects of stress are more gradual and potentially
knowable. The latter are like a systems myopia: --de-
clining market demand, soil erosion, pesticide, resis-
tance, chemical toxicity of groundwater and other changes
are not perceived in their totality. Thus sustainability
means the durability of productivity under known or
possible conditions.
Orians (1975) suggests various conceptual measures for
sustainability (for example, hysteresis, elasticity,
inertia, amplitude) but these have little practical value
in other than the ex-post sense, analytically. The more
useful measure would be in the ex-ante sense: How is the
sustainability of an agroecosystem to be judged based on
cur r en t cuI t u r alp r act ice s ? A par t i a 1 an s we r t a th i s
question lies with an understanding of the nature of the
"subsidies" necessary to maintain productivity of the
agroecosystem. Fertiliser, pesticides, fossil energy,
scientific knowhow and other inputs aim to mitigate
stress in agroecosystems. For example, in Figure 3 four
different possible effects of pest management are illus-
trated. The use of pesticides can have several types of
consequences, ranging from productivity maintenance with
continued use (as intended) to productivity collapse even
with increased use (unintended resistance or toxity). It
may be possible that a biological control agent could
supplant chemical control all together. Three of the
four cases illustrated meet the definition of sustaina-
bility, but they do not provide a complete answer to the
question of choice. Another example of the use of
agroecosystem properties is Altieri's (1986) Critique of
California agricul ture (Figure 4). One jmportant issue
not depicted in Figures 3 or 4 is the relative risks of
input use unrelated to productivjty of thp agroecosystem.
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Equity concerns the distribution of goods and services
according to the governing rules of the human institu-
tions which are part of the agroecosystem. These can be
qui te arbi trary: from laissey-fai re to purel y dictato-
rial. The fairness of the distribution may ultimately
feedback into productivity of the system (for example.
via the structure of incentives between capital. land and
labour). Measure of equity are typically obtained with
the use of Lorenz curves. Gini coefficients or similar
indices (Fields. 1980).
Besides these four primary properties there are other
ways to characterise agroecosystems. For example. the
descriptors material conservation. energy intensity~
pesticide residuals, autonomy, self sufficienty, cultural
acceptability, etc are often used to describe agroecosys-
terns and processes. However these features can all be
shown to contribute to one or more of the primary system
properties. Further these properties are linked with
each other both within and between agroecosystems at
different levels in the hierarchy. Since the linkages
can be complimentary and competitive, they should be
regarded as "normative indicators of performance" rather
than neutral descriptors (Conway, 1987).
The tradeoffs between the normative performance criteria
can be significant. For example. stability and sustaina-
bility at the farm level may depend upon a diversity of
crop and livestock systems, each perhaps less productive
than its maximimum potential and individually less sus-
tainable than the total farm. Such risk-spreading
through diversification is a common feature of most
traditional farming systems. The tradeoffs between the
primary properties comprise, in effect, a range of dis-
tinctive agroecosystem strategies. This information can
become a powerful explanatory tool for the analysis of
historical agricultural systems or system change over
time. There are many good examples of how agroecosystem
thinking has helped to explain the dynamics of agricul-
tural change. Several of these are briefly reviewed in
the following section.
Some Recent Applications
A popular use of agroecosystem theory is its role in the
historical explanation of system failure. Man's rela-
tionship to the natural environment, and nature's influ-
ence or the cause and quality of human life, are among
the oldest topics of speculation (Barnett and Morse.
1963). Understanding the origin. flowering and decline
of pre-modern (agricultural) economies provides insight
into the possible long-term consequences of present
resource use and misuse.
Bender (1975). Cohen (977) and Hindos (984) trace the
origins of agriculture throughout the world and conclude
that productivity and stability were the overriding
concerns of early society. There were consequences for
sustainabi1ity and equity however. The Mayans, Mesopota-
109
mians and Carthaginians who lived in an era when
environmental stress mounted slowly -- apparently did not
understand the forces at work which undermined their
flourishing societies. Their agroecosystems collapsed
because the consequences of salinity, erosion and popu-
lation pressure meant they could not be sustained.
Conversely, some forms of intensive agriculture have been
successfully practical in Asia for over 40 centuries
(King, 1927). Spain has some of the world's oldest
existing irrigation systems and institutional arrange--
ments yet they are "models" of economic efficiency and
equity by today's standards (Maass and Anderson, 1986).
Watt (1986) summarises the growing consensus among these
analysts: "the most important destabilizing forces
operating on socio-economic-environmental systems may be
outside the systems themselves. This is a plausible
idea ..• any living system has persisted a long time
[because] it has evolved internal self-stabilizing
mechanisms that tend to maintain [itself] and thus
decrease the probability of system extinction." (p.2).
Aston (1981) describes one of the world's oldest agroeco--
systems the British manorial system --which existed
from the 7th to 14th Centuries. The basis of the system's
sustainability was a field rotation of fallow, followed
by a sequence of grains and legumes and then back to
fallow. The system reduced the incidence of pest losses
and made use of available manure. Village council
(institutional arrangements) were import.ant in control-
ling cultural operations, animal grazing intensity and
tenure. Equity was apparently a major concern in this
system as reflected in fairly rigid rules applied in the
distribution of cropland and grazing rights. While grain
yields were low there was remarkable stability in the
productivity over many centuries. The system eventually
broke under the pressures of population, soil fertility
exhaustion, and social revolution. The enclosures of
open lands to produce individual estates and land hold-
ings resulted in marked productivity increases, and with
the scientific revolution of the 18th Century this high
productivity became sustainable via intensive recycling
of crop and animal waste.
How sustainable is modern agriculture? The dramatic
increase in productivity in the 20th Century is without
parallel in human history. So too is population gro\Vth,
soil erosion, waste discharge, exhaustion of water sup-
plies and some other strategic inputs, and the incidence
of institutional responses to perceived social and eco-
nomic problems such as agricultural protectionism (Cros-
son and Brubaker, ]982, Brown, 1980). Until the last
several decades many of the major agricultural regions of
the world were different from each other in terms of the
relative importance of agroecosystem properties. Con\Vay
(]9B7) points out, for example, that the 'dust howl'
occurred in the United States at a time when conservation
agriculture \Vas \Videly practiced in Furope. Today, ho\V-
ever, the pursuit of high productivity sgriculture in
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both developed and developing countries poses questions
of long term sustainability which are mutually shared.
Sustainability and equity properties of agroecosystemns
are emerging worldwide research agenda issues.
RESEARCH IMPLICATIONS
The extent to which low-input, low-chemical alternative
agriculture systems have been adopted in the United
States is quite significant
(CAST, 1980; USDA, 1980; OTA, 1982). For example, the
extent of conservation tillage in 1980 ,",'as estimated at
about 65 r.Jillion acres. In the same year there were
approximately 45,000 commercial organic farms. However,
the number of farmers that practice some form of sustain-
able agricult.ure at the present time is not known. The
st.udies that have been undertaken to date indicate with
conventional farms in terms of net income. Yields of
crops and livestock are typically lower on organic farms.
However, the number of farmers that practice some form of
sustainable agriculture at the present time is not known.
The studies that have been undertaken to date indicate
that these farms generally compare favourably with con-
ventional farms in terms of net income. Yields of crops
and livestock are typically lower on organic farms, but
this is offset by less expenditure from fewer purchased
inputs. Comparative assessments of alternative farming
practices are still hindered, however, by inconsistent
methods of inputing values to unpriced inputs such as
family and operator's time. So far there are very few
similar studies on sustainable farming practiced in New
Zealand.
Using the U.S. experience as a guide, one of the first
questions that deserves resolution in New Zealand would
be the broad information needs. such as:
- pest resistance to pesticides?
- decline of soil
erosion and other
productivity and nutrient loss through
practices?
- future supplies and costs of farm energy, concentrated
nutrients and petrochemicals?
- health hazards to humans and animals?
- damage to beneficial insects and wildlife?
- food quality and halding requirements?
- decline of country towns and family farms?
- reduced environmental amenities and assimilative capac-
ities?
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- restrictive government policies and market failures?
- adequacy of farmer, consumer, researcher and supporting
information systems (concerned about sustainahility)?
The next steps would be to id(!ntify and examine the range
of options available for taking a closer look at some of
these present and emerging problems. Good candidates in
this exercise are the many institutional arrangements
which clearly have great potential for impacting farmer
and public decisions both negatively and positively.
Other logical needs will include case studies of specific
problems in order to develop the appropriate methodolo-
gies with which to effective deal with them.
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Introducti9n
Animal breeders refer to measurable attributes of animals as
traits and the subset of
as breeding objectives.
which are responsive to
to greater profit.
traits which they wish to improve
The trick is to select objectives
selection and which will contribute
In applying selection to a trait, breeders use the best
estimate of an animal's breeding value from measurement of
that trait in the animal itself and from measurements made
on its relatives. Because there is often a genetic
correlation between traits, measurements on correlated
traits can be used to improve the estimate of an animal's
~reeding value for a related trait. Using statistical
techniques best estimates are made of an animal's breeding
value for each breeding objective.
The breeding values of each trait must be weighted by so-
called economic values to calculate a selection index. This
index combines the breeding values for each trait into a
single dollar value (Cunningham 1969).
Hazel (1942), who first applied selection index theory to
animals, defined the economic value of a trait as:
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net profit of the optimal
to increase fora unit
" the amount by which net profit may be expected
to increase for each unit improvement in a trait."
Because of the imperfections in the market for stud stock,
animal breeders use a normative approach to esti~ate
economic values for each trait. Partial budgeting is the
preferred technique. For sheep, for instance, breeders
estimate the extra profit resulting from a 100 gram gain in
a ewe's fleece weight.
Recently, McArthur (1986) proposed a modification to Hazel's
definition as:
" the amount by which
policy may be expected
improvement in that trait."
Two examples will help explain ~he reason for the
modification. Suppose a pair of economic weights are
required for a selection index for sheep - one for w601
weight and the other for Number of 1.ambs[orn. For NLB, the
optimal policy with low fertility sheep may be (easy care'
management at lambing time. The optimal policy for high
fertility may be to employ labour for shepherding at
lambing. The optimal management systems along with their
associated costs should be used when comparing profits from
a change from low NLB ewes to high NLB ewes.
The trait of disease resistance in egg producing chickens
provides another example. Before the improvement in disease
resistance, the optimal policy may be to replace birds
yearly. After selection for disease resistance, biennial
replacement may be more profitable. The gain in profit from
selection is the net profit from improved disease-resistant
birds replaced using the optimal biennial policy minus the
net profit from the unimproved disease-susceptible birds
replaced using the optimal annual replacement policy.
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I have found some reluctance amongst animal scientists to
accept the idea of counting a gain as due to breeding which
comes from a change in management policy. However,
economists believe that
had disease-resistant chickens.
maximisers and that
replacement policy if
they
they
producers
would
tend to be profit
shift to a biennial
I believe, be counted in the
Their response to genetic
response in the birds should,
gain in profit.
improvement as well as the
A__~-y~!:..~ms A..Ju~..!:_gnc4 for Calculat i!lg Economic Values
Following the definition of
in a trait, this section
economic value of a unit change
describes a general systems
approach for finding them.
Let ITO be the initial net benefit
changed. This may be annual profit
the farm level. At the national
before the trait is
if the analysis is at
level for the farming
less cost using some appropriatesystem it will be benefit
numeraire. Judgement is
system boundaries.
required as to where to put the
* *nO = f(D O ' A, T ) (1)
where: D6 is a vector of optimal decision variables before
improvement. A is a vector of parameters including
prices, input-output coefficients, and technical
constraints which are held constant. T is a vector
of trait variables set at existing average levels.
IT6 is optimal profit resulting from applying the
vector of optimal decisions.
For the i th trait the t-value in vector T is increased by a
appropriate amount
D~ is found which
1
The economic value
6t. . A new vector of optimal decisions
1
results in the maximum net benefit rr~.
1
for the i th trait, v. is
1
*v. = (rr,1 1 (2)
These v - values can be
through by the number of
relative economic values.
expressed per animal by dividing
animals or be simply expressed as
Anyone of a number of optimising methods could be used to
find the best set of decision variables ranging from simple
partial budgeting, through differential calculus and
mathematical programming to simulation.
This systems approach
various traits can be
to deriving economic
applied when this
weights for
is the last
operation in designing a programme for animal improvement.
Usually a large data set has been collected for various
traits on a population of animals. From this data set the
technical statistical parameters are derived to construct a
selection index. The last step is to estimate the econoiliic
weight for each objective.
However, the systems approach should really be applied at
the outset as a method of looking for breeding objectives -
perhaps by looking for marketing opportunities. As an
imaginary example, systems research might revea~ th~t a
subset of the human population are allergic to ailerg~~~·in
milk which can be selected against. A systems analysis
would attempt to estimate the price of such allergen-free
milk and to find the relative weights which should be placed
on this and other breeding objectives.
E~onomic Values by Rescaling
Recently Smith, James and Brascamp (1986) have published a
method of deriving economic weights which result in relative
economic weights which are the same for various perspectives
- per unit of product, per animal, and per producer. In
order to achieve this uniformity they suggest the imposition
of two conditions.
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Th~ first condition eliminates the need -to distinguish
between variable and fixed costs by estimating the impact of
genetic change in the context of long-run decisions where
all costs are variable. They justify this approach on the
ground that breeding gives long-run gains which is logical.
However, economists usually assume that in the long-run
producers face diseconomies of scale with rising long-run
marginal costs. They also assume that in the long-run
producers are profit maximisers and equate the long-run
marginal cost with the product price at which point
producers are operating at the most profitable scale.
The second condition imposed by Smith et al. is that any
extra profit from genetic change that could also be obtained
by altering the size or rescaling the operation should not
be counted in assessing the value of genetic improvement.
This, they claim, is because a producer can change profit
without genetic improvement simply by rescaling his
production enterprise. They do not provide the economic
rationale for not counting these scale effects.
An example from a dairy farm will explain the application of
their second condition.
Suppose selection increases milk fat production per cow by
I kilogram and that farm profit rises by say $800 because of
total product rising by 200 kilograms. By Hazel's
definition the economic value would be $800. Smith et al.
say that the scale of operation has been increased by
200 kg. They say that this effect must be removed. A 200
kg increase in total product could be achieved with
unimproved cows by "extending the boundaries of the farm"
sufficiently to produce an extra 200 kg. Such an adjustment
to the farm's scale might increase profit by say $300.
Subtracting this from the $800 leaves $500 which is the true
economic value.
There are two difficulties with the Smith et ala method.
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1. Under the assumption of profit maximisation and eventual
diseconomies of scale, producers simply cannot increase
profit by rescaling the size of their enterprises
because they would already be at the optimum scale where
price equals long-run marginal cost. Extending the
boundaries of the farm to match the increase in
production using unimproved cows would yield a zero gain
in profit. Subtracting the effect of rescaling would
leave the value of $800 untouched.
The examples given by Smith et al. use linear long-run
production functions which ignore the possibility of
eventual diseconomies of scale. Production per cow
would be the same for the cow walking 2.5 km a day to
and from pasture in a herd of 300 as for the cow walking
8 km daily to pasture in a herd of 3000. Under these
conditions it is always possible to increase profit by
increasing the scale of the operation. This leads to
the consideration of the second difficulty.
2. This concerns the economic justification for extracting
the effect of scale from the economic value calculated
in the usual way. Production decisions concerning a
proposed course of action often result in increases in
output. Such courses of action should be adopted if the
value of the extra output exceeds the costs of the extra
inputs where costs include opportunity costs. To
subtract net benefits from expanding the scale of the
enterprise could result in suboptimal decisions. When
non-zero effects of rescaling are removed from economic
weights as conventionally calculated they do not measure
change in profit.
Some Examples
Some examples will amplify both the modification of Hazel's
definition and the rescaling procedure.
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Suppose that production per cow of milk fat (AP) falls as
the scale of a dairying operation increases. The scale here
is measured by the number of cows being put through one
shed. x is the number of cows in
AP = a + bx ( 3 )
where a is positive and b is negative, and total product TP
is
TP 2- ax + bx (4)
resulting in total revenue TR of
where p is the price per unit of milkfat.
(5)
Cost per cow c is 0 constant and total cost is cx resulting
in a profit equation of
2
n - (pa - c)x + pbx (6)
The profit maximising scale of operation in terms of number
of cows is where dn/dx = O. The optimum scale x* is
*x = (c - pa)/2pb ( 7 )
If production per cow in equation 3 increases by one unit as
economic value of a unit
the result of selection a shifts
*increase in profit is px. The
change in milk fat per cow E1 is
to a + 1. The consequent
E1 = (c - pa)/2b
or simply p dollars per cow.
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(8)
production per cow total productin
through the use of more
*Unimproved cows produce a + bx per cow so
of them would be required to raise total
* * *Extra profit would be (x /(0 + bx »drr/dx .
COh's.
*+ hx )
*x .
unimproved
that x*/(u
product by
Because of a unit shift
*has shifted by x. Smith et al. insist on correcting E I for
this change in scale and require that the extra profit from
*increasing the total product by x
Subtracting this term from HI to find an economic weight as
calculated by Smith et al. leaves HI unchanged because
dTf/dx* is zero.
The second condition imposed by them does not alter the
economic value when the profit maximizer faces diminishing
returns. The Smith et al. economic value E2 is
H2 = EI - (x/Ca + bx»drr/dx
2
= ex =-.Pbx
a + bx
A unit shift in production per cow would in theory
result in reassessment of the optimal scale. The optimal
size of the operation, as given by equation 7, would shift
from (c - pa)/2pb to (c - p (a + 1»/2pb. By this author's
definition, the economic weight 8 3 is
I\3 := C - pa +
2b
-p
4b
(10 )
The extra term 1S an addition due to the shift to the new
optimal scale of operation and represents the optimising
management change appropriate for running better cows.
Smith et al. use as an example a linear production function
without any falloff in output per animal as the size of the
enterprise grows.
AP = a
TP = ax
rr = (pa - c) x
(11 )
(12 )
(13 )
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This profit equation has no optimum. Profit can always be
increased by increasing the scale of operation. If
production per cow is increased by one unit through
selection, a increases to a + 1 and profit n 1 is
TTl ;;: (p (a + 1) - c) x
The economic weight by Hazel's definition E4 is
E ;;: IT - TT - px4 1
or p dollars per cow
However, total product will now be x (a + 1).
(14 )
(15)
This total
product could alternatively be produced with unimproved cows
producing only a if the enterprise was rescaled so that it
runs x (a + 1)/a cows. This rescaling is possible because
AP is not affected by the scale of operation.
The profit equation for the rescaled enterprise is
n 2 ;;: (po - c) x(a + l)/a (16)
Smith at al. claim that this is the base from which to
measure increased profit.
Change in profit from a unit increase in a for them ES is
E ;;:5 TTl - n 2 = ex/a (17)
which is cia per cow.
This result makes the economic weight a function of cost and
excludes the price of the product. cx/a measures the
reduced costs of producing a fixed level of output as shown
below.
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Suppose that output is fixed at a because of a quota so that
the scale of the enterprise is fixed at ala cows. The
profit equation is
n - (pa - c) ala
and the reduced cost of producing 0, ES is
2ES = dn/da = cOla = cx/u
(18 )
(19 )
Smith et al. are aware that their rescaling procedure can
eliminate product price from economic values and write "Thus
the economic value of genetic improvement comes from
reducing costs per unit of product value, rather than
changing output (or output value)".
Discussion
The method of rescaling advocated by Smith et al. measures a
different aspect of economic gain depending on the form of
the production function used. If the model assumes profit
maximisation and diseconomies of scale their economic value
simply measores the usual gain in profit from a unit change
in a trait because the correction for rescaling is zero. If
the model assumes a linear production function their method
measures reduced cost of producing a fixed quantity of
output. In this instance, prices of output can be ignored.
Some animal breeders see this as an advantage because output
prices are unstable and are subject to a great deal of
uncertainty in the long-run. Moreover, in Europe, output is
constrained by quotas for some forms of animal production
and the objective of minimising costs of production may be
seen as the true objective. However, if this were the
global objective, it would seem more appropriate to measure
this directly rather than confuse the issue by using a
rescaling procedure whose effect depends on the underlying
production function behind the profit equation.
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For the selection of multi-purpose animals estimating the
gain in profit from a unit gain in a trait when following
the optimal policy seems
finding economic values.
a much more general framework for
Such values do not ignore the
price of the product and hence the willingness of the
consumer to pay.
omission.
To ignore product prices seems a serious
Product prices are essential for economic weights for multi-
purpose animals such as the sheep. Here breeding objectives
include wool and meat whose relative economic importance
cannot be measured without
products.
the use of prices of these two
Finally, the identification of breeding objectives and their
economic valuation through a systems approach is likely to
result in a more innovated and market-led approach to making
best use of animal breeding technology.
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SUMMARY
Marketing In the classical sense requires producers to
anticipate and match consumers' needs and wants. At
the farm~gate-level, It Is obvious that agricultural
Industries are not organised to meet this requirement.
This Is not a problem as long as farmers can make their
decisions within a framework of guaranteed prices as In
the case of the EEC. It will almost certainly become a
problem when Individual farmers have to make their
decisions In a deregulated environment as Is envisaged
In New Zealand. This paper endeavours to examine why
farmers have little scope In their production decisions,
and what kind of strategies will be applicable under
these conditions.
Key Words: Farm Diversification, Product Development,
Food Marketing, Advisory Services
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INTRODUCTION
Agricultural marketing strategies, as Indicated by the
title, can be seen In two different ways:
a) General strategies, which are based on universal
characteristics, as they apply to any agricultural
Industry In the world;
b) specific strategies, which are tailor-made to the
situation of New Zealand In 1987.
Personally speaking, I have two good reasons to prefer
the former version. First of all It should be borne In
mind, that the adoption of market led farming is so
complex a procedure, that answers should be based on the
speaker's full body of knowledge. Now I have honestly
to admit, that most of my knowledge was acquired prior
to my arrival In New Zealand, which lends Itself to a
universal approach. The second reason Is probably even
more relevant: the farming community is not a
homogeneous unit. Depending on physical conditions,
the nature of a given product, and the attitude of
Individual farmers, different segments emerge, which
require a number of parallel strategies. Thus It seems
unlikely that none of the following recommendations
apply to New Zealand. Yet It may well be the case that
segments differ In their size and Importance, and that
corresponding strategies will have to be located on
different levels of priorities. I would be happy to
leave this latter point open to further discussion.
A GLOBAL VIEW
Even the most superficial observer of agricultural
commodity markets cannot escape the Impression of huge
gluts and surpluses of unsa1eable produce. It Is true
that during the past ten years, world food production
has grown by nearly 30%, as compared with an Increase of
population by some 20%. This does not deny the fact
that mill Ions of people In the Third World suffer from
hunger. Problems In the Third World, however, have
much to do with the lack of purchasing power - a point
which cannot be pursued here for obvious reasons. It
Is probably a less known fact that on a global scale,
49% of all dairy products; 46% of all meat products; 37%
of all fruits; 34% of all cereals; and 32% of all sugar
are produced in Industrial ised countries, whose share of
world population Is only 18% CSuhler, 1983). Hence the
onus Is transferred back to those countries where
purchasing power Is not an argument. In these parts of
the world In turn, forces are at work which may
potentially aggravate the problem. The enormous growth
of International trade, for example, has lead to an
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abundance of products on the market place, which makes
consumers more discerning In regard to taste, quality,
price, and product appeal. As fewer food retailers
control an Increasingly large proportion of the market,
and own-brand products account for an Increasing share
of each retailer's offering, the "product" is becoming
the store and the "brand" Is the corporate identity by
which the store Is Identified (Sewell, 1986). In such
an environment, only suppliers who offer the best
possible quality at the lowest possible price can
survive. Now, of course, It would be unfair to say
that agricultural Industries - or at least their key
persons - are unaware of the necessity to steer
production In accordance with market realities.
Several approaches In several parts of the world may
serve as an Illustration to outline the opportunities,
and perhaps even more, the 1 imitations of such an
undertaking.
Any visitor In a country belonging to the COMECON
(Council for Mutual Economic Aid) will be In a position
to study the most radical, and perhaps even the most
consequent, approach of agricultural planning. Since
communists however, stubbornly refuse the recognition of
market forces, their approach has fallen into discredit
a long time ago. Even though their attitude towards
marketing Is slowly going to change, other drawbacks
remain in place. Thus a central organisation Is
normally not In a position to judge carefully about the
suitabll ity of a specific area for a specific type of
production. The attempt to extend wheat farming Into
extremely arid areas during the late 1960's, as part of
the so-called "new-land-scheme" In Kasakhstan, was
probably the most conspicuous failure of Soviet
agriculture.
Farming subsidies In the EC (European Community), the
U.S.A. and Japan totalled approximately $NZ130 billion
in 1985, of which the EC alone spent $NZ30 bill ion. (1)
Justification of these subsidies Is overlaid by numerous
arguments applying to the domestic political situation
in those countries, rather than to academic thinking.
The major rationale originally was that subsidies should
provide a buffer against price fluctuations, which occur
almost Inevitably In commodity markets. It Is
Interesting to see where such fluctuations originate
from. If the price of a given commodity Is at some
time above or below the average market price, the
(1) Computed on the base of $NZI = 1.50DM from:
"Folly of food pol itlcs: surplus In that country,
starvation In this one" (The German Tribune,
No. 1239).
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producers expect that this situation will continue; and
even then when they change their supply under otherwise
equal conditions. At this price; which is already
above the equilibrium price; they begin a production
process larger than the equil ibrium quantity. If this
amount is brought to the market at the close of the
production period; the price drops below the equil ibrium
price ceteris paribus. At this point the producers -
again thinking that the price will remain the same
start a production process which 1 ies below the
equil ibrium quantity. If this quantity is brought to
the market; the price will increase above the
equil ibrium price. We now arrive at the original
situation and the circle is completed; the entire
procedure can start again (Plate & Bockenhoff; 1984).
Now It is easy to see what happens in the case of
subsidies: below average prices; and consequently
periods of contraction; are el iminated by definition.
The circle does not close any more. Farmers see 1 ittle
reason why they should 1 imit their production.
Instead; they will sooner or later discover that prices
are made by pol itical bargaining. A new development
starts: surpluses are pll ing up which in turn are used
as an argument to call for even more protection. The
outcome of this development is well illustrated by one
of the most recent press releases:
"Agricultural spending is growing out of control;
and there will be a budget deficit this year of
about $NZ12;OOO mill ion. So far the community
has found no way of controll ing the first; or
avoiding the second. Last week farm ministers
were engaged In a marathon session to try to fix
farm prices; but the longer they go on talking the
bigger the problems become."(2)
Subsidies in the Third World are ruled out by various
reasons; amongst which Insufficient government revenues;
and the need to keep food prices low; are the most
important. LDC's (Less Developed Countries) hope
instead to combat hunger with the help of the "green
rev 0 1uti 0 n" ; wh ichi mp 1 iest he use 0 f mode r n i n put s ;
such as machinery; chemical fertilizer; pesticides and
so forth. Farmers In those countries depend
accordingly on credit schemes as offered by
International corporations in the way of contract
farming; by Foreign Aid organisations of various
nations; and; last but not least; by such reputed bodies
as the World Bank and the FAa. Credit schemes normally
(2) "Budgetary blues again in EEC"; Otago Daily Times;
25 June; 1987.
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require supervision by experts, and these experts in
turn find there unique opportunities to test their
academic theories In a real-world situation. Insofar
as It Is not without benefit to study approaches of
market-led farming In the Third World, In many cases the
results of these experiments do not live up to
expectations. In most of these cases It seems
difficult or Impossible to come to grips with the
following three handicaps:
a) Lack of accurate information regarding the global
development of demand;
b) lack of management skills as required for the
establishment of new marketing organisations; and
c) lack of enthusiasm on the part of the local
farmers Involved.
New Zealand needs to be seen differently again. Here,
there 15 no such thing as subsidies or planning
approaches. Instead, New Zealand's economy depends a
good deal on world market commodity prices.
Deregulation means that the full Impact of price
fluctuations will be passed on to Individual farmers.
Put it another way; farmers who are either not willing
or not able to adapt to market conditions will be
bearing the brunt of deregulation. At this point now,
it Is worthwhile to remember the two basic challenges In
market-led farming: knowledge of demand, and
appreciation of it on the part of the farmers. This
requires an organisation, which on one end of the
plpel ine possesses sufficient skills and resources to
maintain and operate a global Intelligence network - and
- which has staff on the other end of the pipeline who
are familiar enough with the needs and aspirations of
Individual farmers to be capable of either convincing
them to change production Into a more profitable
direction, or - and this may happen as well - to
convince their superiors that there is no room for
changes at all. Apart from agricultural advisory
services it would be hard to find any other organisation
being in a position to match both of these obJectives.
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DECISION MAKING ON A FARM-GATE LEVEL
Physical restraints
Marketing advocates anticipating and matching consumers'
needs and wants 7 which Is normally seen as a task of the
manufacturer or producer. Now It must be recognised
that farmers used to have quite different criteria in
mlnd when planning their production. Squire &
Delahunty (1982) outline seven different constraints
which eventually guide decision making on farms. These
are:
a) Land (area 7 cllmate 7 solls7 off-farm facilities);
b) livestock (breed 7 stock reconciliation);
c) crop (cultivars 7 yields);
d) trading (access to outlets);
e) cash (expenditures 7 revenues);
f) labour (tlme 7 skills);
g) personal (abllltles 7 enthusiasm).
It needs no explanation to realise that farmers are much
more familiar with the above-mentioned requirements than
with the wants of consumers 7 who probably live in some
remote part of the world. IronicallY7 it Is just the
high level of competition In food marketing that forces
farmers even more to give priority to physical
restraints. Thus It Is not enough to say that the land
Is somehow suited for the growth of a certain crop ~ the
land must be perfectly suited In order to achieve
maximum quality at reasonable cost. Skills gain
Importance 7 since farming requires an increasing number
of jobs 7 which cannot be done well without prior
vocational training. Cash may be a severe restraint in
cases where standards in demand can only be maintained
with the help of modern technology.
Even when observing these restraints In a rigid sense 7
there are comparatively few cases where farming is
confined to one single product only. Most of such
examples are found In marginal areas where farming is a
questionable exercise anyhow. In all other areas 7 the
above-mentioned restraints Just provide a framework
within which a farmer may have something between 2 and
20 different options. This leads to some relevant
questions:
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a)
b)
How many options are
making?
What factors define
decisions?
available for
the frequency
declslon-
of these
c) What are the
decisions?
considerations underlying these
In the case of New Zealand It would be very desirable
to find answers to these questions first, before
entering Into details of strategic planning. In the
meantime, however, It Is of value to outline some
fundamentals of agricultural marketing strategies In
order to see what tasks are Involved, and what benefits
can be expected.
The time lag
It takes 4-5 years for a kiwifruit vine to start bearing
worthwhile crops, and about 8-9 years for It to reach
full bearing (Sale, 1983). Regarding the lifespan of
an orchard, little documentation Is available, yet It
might be realistic to assume 50 years. Adding to this
an Initial Investment In the order of half a million
NZ$, It becomes clear that any grower once voting for
kiwifruit will be reluctant to change his production In
favour of short-term demand fluctuation. In the
livestock area the situation Is slightly more
complicated. It 15 true that lamb has a production
period of just a year. Yet If one takes Into account
that a certain amount of breeding stock has to be
maintained, and If one considers the difficulties of
turning grassland Into crops, then it becomes obvious
that the planning period must be a multiple of that
year. In dairy farming, several calculations show the
useful life of a cow In the range of 7 to 9 years.
Little wonder that price fluctuations In world dairy
markets follow that rhythm. The shortest production
period applies for vegetable growers. Unfortunately,
the vegetable market Is very volatile and hence subject
to unforeseeable price movements.
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The case of Turkish horticulture
In the framework of a PhD Thesis on the horticultural
industry In Turkey, I had the opportunity to conduct
Interviews with a total of 124 growers. Real ising
that, given the above-mentioned conditions, It must be
extremely difficult to make any sensible product
decision at all~ I included the following two questions:
(Negendank, 1986)
a) Between sowing or planting and the final sale
there Is a time lag of several months (in the case
of trees even several years). Theoretically, you
have to take count of future demand already when
you decide on your production. How do you solve
this problem?
In reaction, 9% of the growers said that they
approach the agricultural advisory service In .such
question; 23% endeavoured to make their own
forecast; but a remaining majority of 68% could
not see any solution at all.
b) On what considerations do you actually base your
decision then?
In reply, 22% claimed to use their own forecast as
a yardstick; 43% put natural ecological
conditions to the fore; but a strong minority of
35% stated agaIn, that In fact they had no Idea on
how to make a decision. One farmer compared
horticultural production with a lottery game.
These results have several serious implications. If
one accepts that, say, horticulture Is some type of
gambling, then this would be In confl ict with a number
of current economic theories. Thus the Idea of free
competition is generally justified by the assumption
that It weeds out Inefficient enterprises with the
result that only the most efficient ones stay in
business. Now in an environment of extreme
uncertainty, only those businesses will survive which
are lucky enough to make the right forecast. This
might be desirable, If it Is assumed that such forecasts
rely on any type of skill or academic knowledge. Yet
this Is a very questionable assumption. On the other
hand, it Is Interesting to see that at least 9% of those
growers approach the agricultural advisory service. On
further questioning, these growers indicated Indeed that
they recognise both factors: the necessity of having a
forecast, and the impossibility of doing It on their
own. The advisory service would probably have been
more popular If it had had better access to rel iable
data sources. Unfortunately this does not yet apply
for a country 1 ike Turkey.
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The planning approach
Prima facie It would be logical to conclude that
decisions have to be made by an outside organisation, If
farmers are not In a position to do It on their own.
In general, such approaches are associated with a
somewhat "communist" smack, which totally overlooks that
big land corporations practising farming on a contract
basis, do basically the same. The position of a
contract farmer Is not too different from his eastern
counterpart working In some government-controlled co-
operative. In both cases the farmer would not be
entitled to make any decisions on his own. There are
differences, however: A land corporation takes demand
well Into account, and It normally controls only part of
the Industry Instead of the whole. That makes It less
conspicuous and more successful. Yet there Is one
problem difficult to solve: How to assess and control
the potential of a given plot of land from central
headquarters? In many countries, where advisory
services are not necessarily forthcoming to support
private Interests, such a corporation will be forced to
employ Its own staff of experts. This In turn Is a
cost factor which needs to be outweighed by additional
profits. This may be the case when control over supply
provides some specific advantage. In buyers' markets,
however, where high quality, low price agricultural
produce Is abundant, this advantage Is not particularly
strong. The corporation Is then left with the option
of either withdrawing from production and confining
Itself to mere trade functions - as In several parts of
Europe - or virtually to exploit contract farmers - as
In several parts of the Third World. The latter, quite
naturally, makes contract schemes extremely unpopular
among farmers.
The other extreme Is to recognise commercial farms as
businesses, where the owner/operator Is the ultimate
decision maker. Guidance would be only given on
request, normally at the end of a production period when
the farmer has to decide whether he wants to renew
previous production, I.e, by purchasing the same type of
stock (or seeds or seedlings) again, or whether he wants
to venture Into new areas. At least at this point,
farmers are normally eager to use forecasts providing
them with some clue In regard to the possible outcome of
either direction. The challenge here lies with the
fact that farmers who actually ask for a forecast
normally rely on the superior knowledge of the
organisation which provides such advice. In theory,
the farmer ought to be free either to accept or to
reject the data given by the forecast. In practice,
many a farmer may be Inclined to rely blindly on the
data, and consequently blame the advisor when the
outcome does not meet expectation.
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Before entering into this controversial Issue" I would
like to draw your attention to some other strategies
which might be more palatable from a p.olltlcal point of
view.
AGRICULTURAL MARKETING STRATEGIES
Core demand strategy
Marketing consultants quite naturally focu~ on pornts"
where their clients arrive at a road fork. In the case
of farmers" this applies to the tIme when the lifespan
of one production cycle has expIred" and some decl~lon
has to be made about the next eyc Ie to come.
Superficially" this gives way to the ImpressIon that
marketeers would be advocates of change. In
agriculture this Is not appropriate. If someone argue~
that farmers used to be conservative" then It should be
borne In mind that consumers also used to be
conservatIve. ThIs Is particularly true In regard to
foodstuff" and In partIcular when the total globe Is
considered as a market. Even though markets of butter"
lamb" beef or wheat provide headaches for many an
expe rt" Itis obv Ious that consume rs we re 1ess than
happy" I f such we 1 1 known products sudden I y dl sappeared
from the market. Surpluses refer only to a certaIn
percentage of productlon - often less than 50%. In
thIs case" only a minority of farmers would have to
change production; probably those who are on the
outlook for new areas anyhow. The remaining majority
will be fairly safe In their traditional area. The
challenge now Is to discern between both groups~
Based on similar considerations" the EC recently
Introduced quota regulatIons for milk. Yet politicIans
also perceived farmers as an electorate" and hence
allocated quotas In such a generous manner that any
effect on the market place will be close to zero. A
more consequent approach was adopted In SwItzerland
about ten years ago. On the grounds that high country
farmers have lIttle or no production alternative"
preference was given to dairy farms located l"OOOm or
more above sea level. Exceptions from this contour
1 Ine were admitted" If required by topography.
According to an executive of Swiss advisory services"
law courts were kept busy with sorting out these
exceptions at least for a couple of years. The O.C.E.
(Office de Commercialisation et d'Exportatlon) In
Morocco operates as some kind of marketing board for
tomatoes" a product generating some 13% of the country's
Income. The O.C.E. keeps close contact with major
horticultural Importers" and hence Is In a position to
forecast expected demand before the growing season
starts. According to these forecasts" export quotas
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are allocated. Moroccan farmers, however,
about "abnormal percentages" of non-exportable
(Hormann, 1979).
complain
produce
The administrative problem of these approaches lies with
the fact that quota-regulations were exerted on a
nation-wide basis. The alternative Is defining small
areas of specific micro-climate and soil conditions,
where product output Is distinguished enough to justify
a separate brand. Such justification Is given, for
Instance, when local growing conditions have a marked
Impact on flavour and taste, and when at least some
segment of the market shows preference for the resulting
flavour. This branding approach has several
advantages. Distinguished brands are likely to be
accepted In those segments where the corresponding
product ranks high In the preference scale. Branded
products thus attract the most loyal ones among
potential consumers; an effect which is Incl ined to
create some stabll ity In otherwise volatile markets.
In many cases, the better flavour may justify premium
prices, and hence improve incomes of the farmers
Involved. Taken all together, access to such brand
must be seen as a privilege, which In turn gives much
power to any organisation which has legal rights on this
brand. Normally this power will be used to Impose
various rules and regulations, designed to Improve
performance of those farmers who have joined the
corresponding scheme. Improved performance, of course,
adds a second quality factor on top of the given natural
advantages, and thus enhances the brand-profile. Given
such circumstances, farmers are likely to face
additional challenges In the way of skills and workload
required. The reward consists of higher prices and a
fairly safe market.
The paramount organisation, which owns the brand, will
be a producer co-operative in such cases where farmers
discover natural advantages within a given area, and
hence decide to organise themselves under a common
brand. Evidence of natural advantages may be derived
either from historic reputation - as Is frequently the
case In Europe, or It may be the result of
contemporary agricultural research. In cases where
farmers are not aware of their advantages, Initiative
may come from a food manufacturer who Is on the lookout
for specific types of supply. Provided that such
manufacturer offers long-term del Ivery contracts at a
premium price, there will be a similar outcome as
described above. Here again, the manufacturer who
possesses a premium brand will be In a strong position
to Impose various quality regulations. Examples of
both directions, I.e., Initiatives from co-operatives or
from manufacturers, can be found In Europe typically In
markets such as wine, horticultural products, and dairy
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products where cheese needs to be mentioned In
particular. In regard to these products, there is a
general appreciation that taste qualities stand in
relation to environmental factors. Many of the
corresponding production areas enjoy longstanding
reputations in respect to a specific product or brand.
In New Zealand, where historic reputations have had less
t Ime to deve lop, it seems pa ramount to devote mo re
research Into the relationship between growing
cond I t Ions and the taste of a product, In order to
Identify regions which lend themselves to the
development of profitable brands.
A special case Is the market of organic food products in
Central Europe. Even In 1979 the market of health food
In the Federal Republic of Germany had a volume of,
then, 2 bill ion DM (Weindlmaler, 1982). Taking into
account the subsequent growth of this market as well as
the development of exchange rates, a translation into 2
billion NZ$ might probably be an understatement. Since
health food consumers are particularly anxious about the
purity of their food, organic products were marketed
through separate channels from the early beginning. In
order to maintain sufficient control over these
channels, strong brands developed, for Instance, BIOlAND
and DEMETER. The corresponding organisations are now
seeking contact with New Zealand - obviously because
their customers do not wish to renounce from off-season
products.
Product Diversification
A good introductIon Into this concept Is given b' David
Yerex (Yerex, 1980). Historically, diversification was
a risk-avoiding strategy, where a single farm
endeavoured to grow a maximum of different products In
the hope that - Independent o¥ the actual market - at
least some of them will fetch acceptable prices In a
given year. This attitude Is still prevailing among
mediterranean fruit growers who face enormous problems
In finding any reliable forecast to guide their long-
term investment decisions. Diversification taken in
this sense logically denies the goal of profit
maximisation: If, say, 10 out of 20 different tree
crops are profitable In a given year, then the other
half of production must be non-profitable.
Risk minimization In this sense applies to New Zealand
only on a nationwide basis. Individual producers may
well address their major thrust to a single speciality
such as opossum, feljoa, or salmon. In doing this, the
farmer as an individual may find himself In an extremely
volatile market. The point is that even small changes
in production may be strong enough to upset a market
which has a narrow base of demand. Due to a lack of
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relevant data concerning New Zealand's specialities, I
have to use the marketing of mangoes In France as an
illustration. Total demand In 1986 was 6,OOOmt,
whereas supply came from 33 different provenances, which
means an average of less than 200mt per supplier (3).
Apart from the question of whether a comparatively small
market should be shared by that many competitors; It Is
remarkable to see countries like Brazil In this context,
which has such a huge agricultural potential that the
figure of 6,OOOmt of mangoes would probably not even
appear In her national statistics. In such cases, very
thorough methods of Investigation are required, because
events which seem to be Insignificant in one country,
may have a disproportionate Impact in another place.
Fortunately it may be easier to monItor a small market,
In particular If the business Is concentrated in a few
hands, and If It Is possible to establ Ish and maintain
good relations with the relevant businesses. This
procedure will be facilitated In case corresponding
busInesses are Interested themselves In a global
monitoring approach.
Processing
FollowIng the current way of discussion, It sometimes
appears that processing of agricultural products Is
s 1 Ight 1y confused with the "va 1ue added" concept. In
the first Instance, at least, processing adds costs to a
product. The question of whether or not these costs
materialise In added value, must be answered by the
ultimate consumer. Ironically, there are cases where
processed products are sold more cheaply than their
fresh counterparts. A case In point is canned fruit
and vegetables, which appear Inexpensive because:
a) Processing makes use of second grade produce,
whereas the fresh market accepts only first grade
quality. There may be a considerable difference
In price between both qualities.
b) Canning relies on a well established technology,
which can be handled In L.D.C.'s who have the
advantage of cheap labour.
c) Canning of horticultural products benefits from
heavy subsidies In the Common Market.
(3) fel actualltes, Import 1986, May 1987.
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Fortunately, processing Incorporates many more options.
According to the chairman of the German Food
Manufacturers Association, In 1982 along 900 new food
products were registered In the F.R. Germany (Oetker,
1983). This reflects a current trend towards more
Individual istic attitudes in regard to processed
foodstuff. In consequence, a marketeer should reckon
with a large number of comparatively small niches rather
than with some big homogeneous market. Generalisations
are not possible. Research needs to be done on a case
by case approach.
THE ROLE OF AGRICULTURAL ADVISORY SERVICES
Planning and implementing successful marketing
strategies In an agricultural Industry Is virtually an
art of keeping the right balance between two different
poles. One of these poles is current potential and
future development of demand regarding a given product
In a given marketplace. The other pole comprises
production opportunities and enthusiasm of Individual
farmers. History has shown that strategies inevitably
fail when this balance Is lost, I.e., when too much
stress is laid on one extreme at the expense of other
requirements. According to Its self-understanding as
an organisation, any agricUltural advisory service seems
to be the most suitable body to maintain this balance.
Yet the magnitude of the job must not be underestimated.
New Zealand faces a situation where - In the absence of
reverse evidence - every nation of the world might be a
potential market. On top of that; every conceivable
strategy Involves decision-making with long term
Implications. Forecasting becomes a must. Even If
one assumes that skills and expertise are there, then
corresponding research might still cause expenditures
which are Impossible to meet In the current situation.
Co-operation might be an answer. Numerous data-banks,
Intell igence services, research Institutes and trade
associations exist in many parts of the world who
possess a wealth of relevant knowledge. In many cases,
it pays to keep In close contact with Importers who have
sufficient experience In the corresponding business.
As far as New Zealand Is concerned, marketing boards and
authorities, private consultants, and sometimes even
universities, may be able to make their contributions.
The challenge now consists In orchestrating these
contributions in a way that provides maximum efficiency
of research. The prerequisite consists; of course, In
an accurate assessment of the flexibility or
inflexibility of New Zealand's agricultural Industry.
Relevant questions are:
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What percentage of a given production cannot be
changed In the near future?
What cases exist where
applicable?
regional brands are
Where is it possible to find low priced; second
grade produce In order to supply processing
businesses?
What percentage of farmers Is
diversify; and in what direction?
prepared to
The subsequent discussion alone of these questions mrght
be a step In the right direction.
Thank you for your attention.
143
REFERENCES
Hormann; D. (1979). Absatzkoordlnation beim Export von
FrIschgemuse; Insbesondere von Afrika nach Europa.
In: Vermarktung von Agrarprodukten In
Entwlcklungslandern; OAF (ed.); pp 138-160;
Munich.
Negendank; o. (1986). Wege zur Efflzienzverbesserung
der Obst-und Gemusevermarktung In der Prafektur
Icel (Turkel); p. 167. M + M Wlss.; Krefeld.
Oetker; Ao (1983). Ole bedeutung der Ernahrungs-
Industrle fur die deutsche Landwlrtschaft. In:
Agrarmarkte & Agrarmarketing; bbv (ed.); pp 45-51;
Behrls Hamburg.
Plate; R. and Bockenhoff; E. (1984). The Fundamentals
of Agricultural Market Pol Icy. Unpubl.
translation by T.P. Young (German original; BLV
Munich); pp 116-120.
Sale; P.R. (1983). Kiwifruit Culture; p.690 Govt.
Printer; Wellington.
Sewe 11; M. ( 1986) .
Environment.
60.
Effective Merchandising in a Food
Food Marketing; VOl02; No.1; pp 55-
Squire; J. and Delahunty;
Management; pp 39-58.
Eo (1982). Farm Business
Longman Paul; Auckland.
Suhler; G. (1983). Die bedutung des Agrarexports fur
die deutsche Landwlrtschaft. In: Agrarmarkte &
Agrarmarketlng, bbv.(ed.); pp 189-194; Behr's;
Hamburg.
Welndlmaier; H. (1982). Tendenzen der Lebensmlttel-
nachfrage und Konsequenzen fur das Lebensmlttel-
marketing. Conference Paper, GeWISoLa 23rd
conference 29 September-l October 1982; Glessen.
Yerex, D. (1980).
We 11 Ington.
Farm Diversification.
144
D.F. Jones;
